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ABSTRACT
The thesis presents a critique of the tax expenditure
concept. It first traces the history of tax expenditures
housing programs, and then presents a history of the tax
expenditure concept, showing its development in the context
of tax reform.
In Section II, I argue that now that the tax expenditure
concept is being utilized by budget reformers, it must be
adapted to its new context. The drawbacks of using the
tax-reform version of tax expenditure analysis in the new
budget context are presented via a critique of the CBO
study Real Estate Tax Shelter Subsidies and Direct Subsidy
Alternatives. I argue that, if tax expenditure analysis is
to be used as the basis for restructuring housing programs,
it must break out of the narrow tax reform viewpoint and
be melded with housing policy analysis. I present two
alternative ways of melding tax expenditure analysis with
analysis of low-income housing programs, as well as a new
way of analyzing tax expenditures that benefit housing for
the nonpoor.
The final section of the paper points out the limitations
inherent in the tax expenditure concept. First, analysis
of tax expenditures ignores the need to analyze programs
involving other funding formats, namely credit programs and
"uncontrollable" direct subsidy programs, to see if such
programs meet budgetary goals of efficiency, visibility and
accountability of expenditures. Second, a shift from a
focus on tax expenditures exclusively to a focus on analysis
of all forms of "backdoor financing" (e.g. tax expenditures,
credit programs, and uncontrollable direct subsidies) makes
it possible to place the persistance of backdoor methods
of financing in historical perspective.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley Keyes
Title: Tax Expenditure Analysis and Housing Policy Reform
Introduction: the tax expenditure concept and housing
policy analysis
When Stanley Surrey, then Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury and now a professor at the Harvard Law School, intro-
duced the concept of tax expenditures in 1967, his goal was
to obtain a full accounting of federal expenditures as the
basis for budget cuts. A full accounting, he pointed out,
required an appraisal not only of direct subsidies but also
of subsidies given in the form of tax forgiveness, subsidies
he called "tax expenditures." 1 The history of this concept
is the subject of Section I of this paper.
Surrey's message was taken up by tax reformers in the
late 1960s. Their principal focus was on tax expenditures'
undesirable impacts on the tax system: by excusing some people
from paying taxes, they eroded the equity of the Internal
Revenue Code. More recently, Surrey's "tax expenditure
analysis" has been taken up by the Congressional budget reform
movement that culminated in 1974 with passage of the
Congressional Budget Act and the establishment of the Con-
gressional Budget Office. Budget reformers focus primarily
on the failure of tax expenditure programs to meet budgetary
goals, i.e. on tax expenditures' lack of visibility in the
budget and on their cost inefficiency.
Both the tax-reform and the budget-reform versions of
tax expenditure analysis contain much the same strategy for
restructuring expenditure programs. The reformers agree
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that many tax expenditures should simply be abolished, since
many tax expenditures cannot be justified once they are viewed
as expenditure programs. In the case of those tax expendi-
tures that translate into justifiable expenditure programs,
tax- and budget-reformers traditionally support a change in
funding format, recommending that tax expenditures should
be changed into direct subsidies.
The Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) Real Estate
Tax Shelter Subsidies and Direct Subsidy Alternatives uses
this traditional approach. This study focuses on tax
shelters, one set of tax expenditures that tax reformers
found most objectionable, suggesting i) that those tax
expenditures perhaps not justifiable as expenditure programs
(tax shelters for nonresidential buildings and for other-than-
low-income housing) should be abolished altogether; and
ii) that those expenditures (i.e. tax shelters that benefit
low-income housing) that clearly translate into justifiable
expenditure programs should be changed in their funding format
from tax expenditures to "direct subsidy alternatives."
The CBO study's traditional approach to tax expenditure
analysis has severe drawbacks when presented as the basis
for a proposed restructuring of housing programs. The first
drawback stems from the constricted scope of the inquiry
involved in traditional tax expenditure analysis as it
developed in the context of tax reform. Tax expenditure
analysis used for tax reform consists of identifying tax
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expenditures one by one and then abolishing each or trans-
lating it into an alternative funding format (preferably a
direct subsidy) that lacks the tax expenditure's deleterious
impact on the tax system. When the tax-reform approach is
used as the basis for restructuring housing programs, it
severely constricts the scope of the inquiry that forms the
basis of housing policy reform. The CBO study, for example,
by concentrating on a translation of one set of tax expendi-
tures (tax shelters) into direct subsidies, fails to inquire
whether the lower-income housing strategy of which tax
shelters are an integral part itself meets tax, budget and
housing policy reform goals. By failing to question the
desirability of the current housing strategy, the CBO study
in effect endorses it, implying that the major political
effort should be focused not on challenging the strategy
in any major way, but rather on tinkering with the funding
format of one of the many subsidies that comprise the
strategy. Section II.A shows that this passive acceptance
of the current lower-income housing strategy is unfortunate
since the strategy has very severe limitations from the
standpoint of tax, budget and housing policy goals, and
argues that if tax expenditure analysis is to be used as
the basis for restructuring housing expenditures, it must
be integrated with housing policy analysis. 4
Section II.B examines another drawback of traditional
tax expenditure analysis that also stems from its original
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use by tax reformers.5 Tax reformers in attacking tax ex-
penditures chose to focus on tax shelters, since they had the
worst impact in terms of tax beneficiaries (i.e. their tax
subsidies flowed almost exclusively to the rich). If tax
expenditure analysis is to be used to restructure housing
programs, however, reform priorities should not be determined
exclusively by a given tax expenditure's impact on tax bene-
ficiaries; its impact on housing beneficiaries should also
be considered. For example, homeowner deductions, although
they traditionally have been thought of as tax expenditures
less regressive than tax shelters because of their impact
on tax beneficiaries, are spectacularly regressive in their
impact on housing beneficiaries. In fact, once homeowner
deductions are taken into account, they so distort U.S.
housing subsidies that approximately 80% of all federal
housing subsidies go to the nonpoor.6 Any attempt to use
tax expenditure analysis as the basis for restructuring
housing programs, therefore, must address the issue of
homeowner deductions. The CBO study does not do so because
it is part of a tax-reform battle that began with the
Tax Reform Act of 1969,6a a battle in which the focus has
been on tax shelters exclusively. But the Congress should
re-examine the issue of homeowner deductions, particularly
because recent changes in the tax law and in housing
prices have robbed homeowner deductions of their tradi-
tional political invulnerability.
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Section III of this paper somewhat changes the focus. 7
Whereas Sections I and II discuss how the tax expenditure
concept has been used in the past and how it should be used
in the future, Section III focuses on the limitations
inherent in a "tax expenditure" approach. The chief drawback
of tax expenditure analysis is that it defines tax expendi-
tures as the objectionable funding format because tax expendi-
tures lack visibility and are potentially cost inefficient
and regressive. An analysis of all housing expenditures,
however, shows that other funding formats share these draw-
backs. Huge amounts of federal housing aid are given via
credit-subsidy and credit-support programs that may involve
substantial expenditures neither more visible nor less cost
inefficient and regressive than are those housing programs
formulated as tax expenditures. Even the direct subsidies
to low-income housing are far from being the paradigm of
budgetary frankness that tax expenditure analysts have painted
them to be. They, too, traditionally have been designed so
as to hide the long-term costs involved in constructing new
units: the most recent "direct subsidy" program (Section 8)
entails contracts committing the federal government for up
to 40 years to costs impossible to quantify until that period
has run. Section III ends with an analysis of why "backdoor"
forms of financing8 have been so pervasive in American
domestic policy in general and in housing policy in particular.
The section concludes that the claim of tax expenditure analysts
that tax expenditure programs are "inadvertent" is incorrect.
Once tax expenditures are grouped with other forms of
backdoor financing it becomes clear that resort to the back
door persists because such financing resolves basic tensions
inherent in the American approach to domestic programs, of
which housing programs are but one example.
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Section I: The history of the tax expenditure concept
This section begins with prehistory, in the form of a
brief description of modern tax policy from its inception
after World War II until the late 1960s, when Stanley Surrey
introduced the concept of tax expenditures. The purpose of
this discussion is to contest the contention of Surrey and
his school that tax expenditures grew up inadvertently.9
In fact, the basic tax expenditures for real estate are more
accurately viewed as an integral part of the focus on eco-
nomic growth and capital formation that dominated American
tax policy from the end of World War II until the mid-1960s. 1 0
By the mid-1960s, American policymakers had decided that
growth would continue virtually forever, so policies designed
to foster capital formation no longer held unquestioned
priority in tax policy. Attention focused away from capital
formation and economic growth onto the issue of poverty.11
Policies formulated in the earlier period were re-evaluated
in terms of whether they helped those most in need. Inevi-
tably, they were found lacking, since capital formation
policies were by definition designed to benefit those with
capital: businesses and the rich. Surrey's "tax expendi-
ture" brand of tax reform should be viewed as an integral
part of this process of re-evaluation from a poverty perspec-
tive of tax policies originally designed to spur capital
formation.
The bulk of this section traces the introduction and
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development of the "tax expenditure" concept. Its first
major development was in the context of tax reform in the
late 1960s, when the focus was on eliminating tax expendi-
tures from the Internal Revenue Code in the interest of tax
equity. Simultaneous to the first tax reform push, however,
was a movement to make the tax code less regressive not by
abolishing tax expenditures for the rich, but by enacting
new tax expenditures for the poor. Tax expenditure analysis
performed by housing experts traditionally has aligned itself
with one or the other of these two major tax reform trends.
Characteristically, housing experts who oppose existing
housing programs for housing policy reasons independent of
tax considerations have favored eliminating all tax expendi-
tures. On the other hand, housing experts who support the
low-income housing programs enacted since 1968 have recom-
mended introduction of tax expenditure programs for the
poor.
Section I ends with a brief exposition of the "tax
expenditure" concept in the new Congressional budget-reform
context, as an introduction to the critique of the CBO
study in Section III.
A. Tax policy from 1946 - mid-1960s
When the United States emerged from World War II, the
federal income tax rates were for the first time high enough
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so that the tax was a major factor in economic life. Rates
had been very low before World War I, when they were raised
to between 6 and 77 percent. Once the war ended rates fell
precipitously, a trend that was reversed during the Depres-
sion. During World War II, rates climbed to the highest
level ever and the number of taxpayers increased tenfold.
The fall in tax rates that had followed World War I was not
repeated after World War II: tax rates decreased very little
until 1964, when the present 14 to 70 percent scale was
adopted. 12
The rise of the modern American income tax converged
with another important trend: Keynsian economics3 Lord
Maynard Keynes' theory that a free enterprise economy could
be controlled by conscious use of macroeconomic policy had
been used to get the country out of the Depression. Quite
naturally, it remained an important force after the war,
especially since American leaders feared a renewed depression
once the soldiers came home (post-war depressions having
been the rule of the past).
This combination of factors created the first period
of federal income tax policy. The period was dominated by
a desire for economic growth;14 tax policy was viewed as
one of the tools the government could and should use to
achieve that growth. Hence the focus of tax policy was
on capital formation.1 5
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It was in this context that real estate tax expendi-
tures reached their peak. Two sets of tax benefits coalesced
during this period. The first were tax benefits available
to businessmen engaged in real estate development. These
encouraged capital investment directly. The second, consist-
ing of tax benefits to homeowners, assisted capital investment
by in effect lowering the after-tax price of homes held for
personal use, thereby increasing demand for housing.
The most important element of tax benefits for developers,
accelerated depreciation, was invented in this period as a
way of spurring capital formation.16 Depreciation is the method
businesses use to allocate the cost of capital goods among
the years of use. For example, if a $500 typewriter is
expected to last five years, good business practice is to put
aside money into a fund that will be available to buy a new
typewriter after five years. Annual depreciation is equiva-
lent to the amount that must be put aside in a given year.
Depreciation is important for tax purposes because taxes are
imposed only on net business income, i.e. on gross income
minus business expense. Since depreciation is a business
expense, it is tax deductible.
The simplest form of depreciation is straight-line depre-
ciation, under which the business sets aside the same amount
each year ($100, in the case of the example) as tax-deductible
depreciation. Accelerated depreciation, in contrast to
straight-line, allows the business to deduct a higher
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percentage of the total cost (and, therefore, to pay less
taxes) in the early years. This is of economic value because
it defers the moment when taxes are due, and so gives the
businessman the use of his money for a longer period. Since
presumably he will put that money to work, either by rein-
vesting himself or by lending it at interest, the result
will be increased overall investment in the economy.
Before 1946, the Internal Revenue Service favored
straight-line depreciation. In 1946, the Treasury authorized
limited use of accelerated depreciation by administrative
action. However, few taxpayers used accelerated depreciation
until 1954, when the tax law was officially changed to allow
for it.1 7
During this postwar period, a complex set of deprecia-
tion rules grew up giving expression to the capital formation
goal. This was done by allowing different rates of accelera-
tion for different types of buildings.18 New buildings that
added to total available capital were rewarded more than were
existing buildings: 200% (i.e. double) declining balance
and sum-of-the-years' digits depreciation were allowed for
new construction, whereas only 150% declining balance was
allowed for used buildings. 9 The focus on capital formation
also meant that no distinction was made between housing,
commercial and industrial development: the same accelerated
rates were allowed for all buildings.
20The other major provision used with accelerated
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depreciation was that allowing the interest and taxes incurred
while a building was under construction to be deducted in full
in the year they accrued, rather than being capitalized.21
This gave a tax deferral benefit similar to that given by
accelerated depreciation, since capitalization would have re-
quired that a flat percentage (of the total amount of construc-
tion period interest and taxes) be taken each year over the
entire life of the building, whereas deduction allowed the
full amount to be taken in the first year.22
Tax benefits for homeowners were granted in the form of
personal, rather than business, deductions. As noted above,
they induced capital investment indirectly, by raising the
demand for homes (usually single-family) by about 20% above
what it would have been in the absence of the tax benefits. 23
The most important deductions were those for annual property
tax and for interest paid on mortgages. These deductions
date back to the temporary income tax enacted during the
Civil War.24 In 1951, homeowners' were given another tax
break that helped to ensure that they would feel free to
"trade up" to bigger, newer houses. The "capital gains"
25deferral provision provided that a homeonwer who sold his
house26 did not need to pay taxes on the money he received
for that sale to the extent that he invested the proceeds
in another house.
Surrey and his followers make much of their claim
that these tax benefits were "inadvertent."2 7 They point
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to the fact that homeowner deductions and the construction
period interest provisions were not introduced with the
intention of supporting real estate investment. Nor, they
argue, was the accelerated depreciation designed for real
estate: they point to the fact that in Congress the debate
over accelerated depreciation focused not on buildings but
on machinery and equipment.2 8
The passage of the capital gains provision illustrates
that this is not the point. The capital gains provision
was intended to reinforce accepted features of the tax
code because they fit into the capital formation focus of
contemporary tax policy. For the same reason, accelerated
depreciation was made available for buildings and the con-
struction period interest provision was preserved. (The
fact that the debate around accelerated depreciation focused
on machinery and equipment proves no more than that manu-
facturing was the primary focus of the provision, presumably
because it constituted a much larger proportion of the
American economy, than did building construction.) If
Congress had wanted to eliminate accelerated depreciation for
buildings, then or later, it could have done so. As for
homeowner deductions and construction period interest, Congress
could have eliminated them in 1954, when there was a complete
overhaul of the tax code in which many obsolete provisions
were eliminated. Instead, Congress chose to keep these pro-
visions and combine them with new ones to achieve current
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capital formation goals.
The fact that the tax code as the tax expenditure
reformers found it (at least with regard to real estate)
was based on a consistent theory of encouraging capital
investment is important as background to tax reformers'
later efforts to adopt tax expenditures to meet welfare
goals.
B. The tax expenditure concept
1. Introduction of the concept
In 1967, President Johnson was at war with both Vietnam
and poverty, and the country's economy was feeling the pinch.
Johnson, however, who did not want to abandon either war,
asked Congress to vote a 10% surcharge on all income taxes,
and to let him decide where to cut spending. This Congress
did, and so in late 1967 LBJ's Treasury Department was study-
ing the Budget for areas in which spending could be reduced
or eliminated.29
It was in this budgetary context that Stanley Surrey,
the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, introduced the
concept of tax expenditures. He noted that the Treasury
in its analysis of the Budget was overlooking an entire cate-
gory of expenditures. While HEW's direct expenditures made
through subsidy programs were studied line by line, another
set of expenditures had been overlooked. These were "tax
expenditures," money lost not when the Treasury spent money
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it had collected, but when taxes were never collected. The
money was not collected because the recipients were covered
by tax loopholes or preferences that excused them from paying
tax on income otherwise taxable.30 Surrey stressed the need
for a "full accounting" of these expencitures. 31
To this budgetary reform message Surrey added an expen-
diture reform angle:
America faces many social problems that desperately
require solution....Certainly, no one can quarrel
with these social objectives.... [However, tihe
immediate leap to the tax solution serves only to
stultify thinking about these social problems.
Once the leap is made, there is no opportunity to
explore the details of the problems. Yet a great
many useful questions can be asked: For example,
as to low-income housing in urban areas and jobs for
the urban disadvantaged, just why has private enter-
prise not undertaken these tasks in the past? Is
it that the immediate return is insufficient, or
is it that the participation has been seen as only
sporadic? What forms of private enterprise are
best suited to the task?....More crucial, what
measures are needed to induce the participation
With these questions answered as best we can, the
task is then imaginatively to search the arsenal
of possible Governmental action -- if Governmental
assistance is needed -- to see which forms of
Governmental action can be most responsive, effec-
tive and efficient. 32
2. Tax expenditure analysis transformed into a tax reform
message
In 1969, the tax expenditure concept took on a third
personality in the context of tax reform. As Surrey describes
it, the step was a self-conscious one. After he left the
Treasury, he was busy at work developing criteria that should
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be used to choose between tax expenditures and direct
subsidies.
This in turn led to the next step, that of
linking tax reform to the concept of tax ex-
penditures. Again, while in the Treasury, I
had conducted the preparation of a major study
on tax reform that was published early in
1969. This study essentially regarded the
task of tax reform as that of restoring "fair-
ness" to the federal tax system by ending both
the escape of many well-to-do individuals and large
corporations from the burdens of that system
and the ironic contrast of placing an income
tax on those still in the poverty class.
This study, and the proposals it offered,
because the basis for the Tax Reform Act of
1969. In reflecting on these developments
I came to recognize that most of the matters
considered in 1969...related to items in the
Tax Expenditure Budget. This led to the view
...that the task of tax reform lay in a 33
systematic exploration of [tax expenditures.]
The school of tax reform that focused on "tax loopholes,"
as they were called before Surrey, began in the late 1950s,
when Wilbur Mills became Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee. In 1959, Mills tried to set the scene for a major
attack on loopholes by holding a massive series of hearings
that "covered virtually every type of income not subject to
the full impact of the rate schedule" and "still is, more than
a dozen years later, the most comprehensive discussion" of
the subject.34 This effort proved a nonstarter. But the
movement to "close tax loopholes" gradually gained momentum,
and burst out vividly into the political arena a decade
later, when Secretary of the Treasury Joseph Barr delivered
his famous speech in which he focused on the fact that many
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wealthy taxpayers paid little or no tax and predicted a
"taxpayers' revolt."35 The fact that he did not state that
the reason was that their income was covered by tax preferences
simply added to the political uproar. The result was a tax
reform movement, led by Treasury, that resulted in the most
comprehensive overhaul of the tax code since 1954, in the
Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1969.36
This brief historical sketch illustrates that, from
the beginning, the tax expenditure concept had implications
for tax, budget, and expenditure reform. The fact that the
concept affected so many areas merely shows how central and
important an insight it is. However, although Surrey touched
base with each of the three areas implicated, the development
of the tax expenditure concept in each area had a different
political and intellectual history. It is to these that we
now turn.
3. The tax reform context
a. The tax reformers
The tax expenditure concept had its first great flowering
in the arena of tax reform. There it converged with a move-
ment for which (after gathering speed for a decade) the
time had come.
The new "tax equity" focus introduced in the early
1960s created an important reorientation in tax policy. Tax
provisions developed in the post-World War II capital
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formation fervor were reassessed from the perspective of
new concerns. Most programs that had looked desirable in
the old light were found lacking in the new.
Prior to the sixties, tax preferences that benefitted
those with capital had generally been considered desirable,
on the assumption that tax savings would be treated as
capital and so would be reinvested: the economy would grow
and all would benefit. This was part of the central political
thesis of the period, derived from Depression origins, best
expressed by John Kennedy's speechwriters as "a rising tide
raises all ships."
By the sixties, people had stopped focusing exclusively
on the tide and had turned their attention to the height of
the various ships. They found first that the wealthy had
benefitted from the system's capital formation focus: re-
turning capital to its owners through the tax system was,
in the new perspective, giving tax breaks to businesses and
to the rich.37
This change in perspective focused early on accelerated
depreciation. In 1962 and 1963, the Treasury Department
urged Congress to cut back on accelerated depreciation, and
to eliminate it altogether for real estate (allowing only
straight-line).38 The current tax law allowed depreciation
deductions in excess of actual economic depreciation in a
given year. Once the unreflective willingness to give tax
breaks said to encourage capital formation was gone,
accelerated depreciation allowances were unjustifable.
The sharpest transition between the old mentality and
the new was focused on the investment tax credit. Stanley
Surrey himself was the principal architect of the credit in
1961.39 The credit was daring and innovative in the post-
World War II context, since it went beyond the utilization
of concepts, such as depreciation, that were justifiable
in terms of the internal logic of the tax code, to use a
gimmick with no justification other than that it would help
the U.S. catch up with Europe's rate of investment in
industry. 40
But, in the new context, the investment credit in its
zeal to spur capital formation was reviled as a tax expendi-
ture exactly because it completely broke away from the
tax code.4 Surrey had claimed from the beginning that he
was not automatically opposed to all tax expenditures. Said
Surrey in his initial speech:
This discussion is not to be taken as saying
that all tax relief measures are bad -- or that
all are good -- just as it is not intended to
state that all Federal expenditures are bad or
good. This is not a qualitative discussion of
tax preferences or, as some say, tax loopholes. 42
Particularly in the context of his original budget focus,
all Surrey was asking was that tax as well as direct expendi-
tures be recognized as expenditures, and that an informal
choice be made between a tax and a subsidy approach. 43
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But while Surrey's claim persisted, its validity during
the period of tax reform fervor is questionable. The sixties
tax reformers, in Surrey's own words, were primarily concerned
with "restoring fairness" to the tax system. "The prime
objective of income tax reform," Surrey said in his influen-
tial Pathways to Tax Reform in 1973, "is to achieve greater
fairness and thereby restore confidence of the public in
that system...(a) confidence now seriously eroded."4 4
This focus on the tax beneficiaries of the tax expendi-
ture programs led tax reformers to oppose virtually all tax
expenditure programs, on grounds of purifying the tax code.
All tax expenditures aimed at capital formation were opposed
because their tax beneficiaries were those with capital:
businesses and the rich. All tax expenditures that involved
deductions were opposed because they gave higher benefits
the wealthier the taxpayer.45 Tax credits did not have this
effect, but nevertheless they were useless to low-income
taxpayers to the extent that the taxpayer owed less tax than
the credit.46
Particularly in the area of real estate, where all the
major tax expenditures were deductions47 and all but the
homeowner deductions were aimed directly at capital forma-
tion, Surrey and other tax reformers universally recommended
translating extant tax expenditure programs into direct
subsidy equivalents.48 "As to rental housing, the task is
to devise a direct subsidy for low-income housing."4 9
-21-
However, although tax reform goals clearly predominated
in tax expenditure analysis during this period, budget goals
were not completely forgotten. Although they clearly played
second fiddle, they were consistently mentioned as reinforcing
tax reform considerations. While the "prime objective" was
to achieve tax fairness, the "second objective [was] to
restore efficiency and economy in the expenditure of govern-
ment funds... [Tax expenditure analysis] enables us to see
that wasteful expenditure is the other side of the tax
escape coin."50 Thus, during this period, Surrey noted:
To sum up on the effects of the...real estate
tax shelter...the system:
--is costly and inefficient as a means of
getting more housing and other construction;
-- offers no assurance that construction
resources are directed to priority needs...;
--is basically incompatible with the opera-
tion of a fair tax system and the important
objectives of tax reform; and
--is also incompatible with budgetary
responsibility... 51
Arguments one and four are budgetary; argument three is the
tax reform argument. 5 2
The Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1969 was the tax reformers'
first real show of political muscle. The real estate tax
expenditures that had coalesced in the post-war period were
one of their primary targets. Since it seemed politically
unfeasible completely to eliminate them all in one fell
swoop, the strategy adopted was to eliminate as many as
possible, concentrating reform fervor on those provisions
least justifiable in terms of welfare concerns. The result
was that the system of tax expenditures developed to spur
capital formation was gradually adapted to reflect welfare
concerns.
Two changes were made in the treatment of accelerated
depreciation. The first was straightforward: the allowable
acceleration rates were changed. The simple system of per-
mitting double-declining balance (and sum-of-the-years'-digits)
for new construction and 150% for existing buildings no longer
made sense now that the capital formation rationale had lost
its pre-eminence. In fact, once capital formation goals were
submerged and accelerated depreciation was defined as an
expenditure program, giving tax breaks to shopping centers
and office buildings seemed unjustifiable as a governmental
program. So the new accelerated depreciation rates favored
housing. The old capital-formation distinction between
existing buildings and new construction was preserved, perhaps
partially because it had some tenuous rationale in terms
of housing policy.53 The TRA of 1969 allowed double declining
balance and sum-of-the-years' digits only for new residential
buildings,54 150% for new nonresidential,55 125% for used
nonresidential,56 and for used nonresidential, only straight-
line depreciation.57
The second change in the accelerated depreciation pro-
visions, having to do with so-called "recapture," is techni-
cally more complex. The "recapture" concept was an early
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innovation of tax reformers. One of the primary objections to
depreciation allowances is that they allow taxpayers to turn
ordinary income into capital gain. To understand what this
means, it is necessary to understand the basics of the real
estate tax shelter. A simplified explanation follows. An
investor in the 70% tax bracket receives an income flow of
$100,000 per year, which he wishes to shelter. So he invests
$100,000 in year 1 in a building worth $1,000,000, buying it
with a $900,000 mortgage and his $100,000 in cash. Tax law
allows him to depreciate the entire cost of the building
($1,000,000) in spite of the fact that he has paid out only
$100,000.58 Thus the taxpayer can take straight-line depre-
ciation of $100,000/year for 10 years, and pay no taxes at all
on the $100,000 income flow for ten years. At the end of
10 years, he has saved $700,000 in taxes.59 But after 10 years,
his tax benefits are used up, since no further depreciation
deductions are allowed. So he will sell the building, say
for $1,000,000. The proceeds from that sale are income to
him in year 10 and so will be taxed, but at the special lower
rate the tax code allows for the sale of a capital asset
(28% for a taxpayer who would pay a 70% tax on ordinary
60income). So the taxpayer in year 10 pays only the 28% capital
gains tax on his $1,000,000 (i.e. $280,000 in tax). If he
had taken the $1,000,000 as ordinary income at $100,000 each
year, instead of buying the building for tax shelter, he would
have paid 70% per year, or $700,000 over a 10-year period.
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By using the tax shelter he has converted his $1,000,000 in
ordinary income into a $1,000,000 capital gain, saving
$420,000 in tax in the process.61
To eliminate the ability of taxpayers to convert ordinary
income into capital gain, the Treasury in 1963 proposed a recap-
ture provision. The basic idea was that, if a taxpayer bought
a building, took accelerated depreciation, and then quickly
re-sold the building, the tax lost to the Treasury would be
"recaptured." The specific proposal was that any owner who sold
his building for a profit would have to pay tax at the ordinary
income rate, rather than the capital gains rate, to the extent
that his income from the building sale represented the recovery
of depreciation previously deducted.62 Under this proposal,
part or all of a taxpayer's capital gain would be taxed as ordi-
nary income unless the property had been held at least ten years
at the time of sale.
Under the TRA of 1969, recapture was limited to that
amount of depreciation in excess of straight-line.63 However,
escape from recapture was eliminated for all except residential
buildings. In addition, the new law required that housing be
held for 16 2/3 years (100 months) in order to avoid recapture.
Thereafter, the amount subject to recapture decreased by 1%
per month.
The example involving the investor with his $1 million
in income, because it provides a simple explanation of how a
real estate tax shelter works, shows why tax reformers focused
on the tax shelter. The investor in the example ultimately
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"earns".$400p00 Cmoney he would have had to pay to the govern-
ment but for the tax shelter) on a $100,000 investment.64 Tax
reformers focused on tax shelters because they constituted a
source of steep profits for investors at large costs to the
Treasury.
Nonetheless, depreciation was by no means the largest tax
expenditure benefiting housing. By one of Surrey's estimates,
accelerated depreciation was costing the Treasury close to $750
million per year,65 at about the time when homeowner deductions
were costing close to $3 billion.66 Treasury never pushed the
issue of homeowner deductions, however, presumably because they
seemed to have unbeatable support among the voters and because
present subsidies are so large that abrupt removal would have
serious economic consequences. As a recent Congressional study so
delicately worded it in explaining why Treasury began its tradi-
tion of demuring on the issue in 1964:
When the tax code was revised in 1964 to specify types
of nonbusiness expenses that could be deducted, treat-
ment of property taxes and mortgage interest were re-
tained because removing these deductions would have pre-
cipitated a large shift in overall tax burdens. 67
b. The counterargument against the tax reformers
While Surrey led the tax reform movement, others began
mobilizing his ideas to support the position exactly opposite
to his own. This group accepted Surrey's insight that tax
expenditures were expenditures.68 They also agreed that exist-
ing tax expenditures (mostly enacted to encourage capital forma-
tion) tended to be egregiously regressive. But their solution
was to enact tax expenditure programs for the poor to balance
those available to the rich.
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In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the tax reformers'
political strategy of concentrating their energies first on
those tax loopholes least justifiable from a welfare perspec-
tive coincided with the strategy of this second group. Both
groups' short-term strategy was to adapt extant capital
formation tax expenditures to reflect welfare concerns. One
result of the short-term strategy of both groups was the
changes to the accelerated depreciation provisions (discussed
above) in which housing was favored over other forms of real
estate. But tax reformers' strategy diverged sharply from
that of the second group on the issue of whether new tax ex-
penditures should be enacted to benefit the poor.
Those who supported enactment of tax expenditures for
the poor gave two reasons in support of their approach. One
was that tax expenditures should be mobilized for the poor
because it was not feasible politically to eliminate the tax
expenditures for the rich. But the strongest argument regarding
real estate tax shelters was that tax incentives should be used
because they were particularly suited to effect the latest
idea in low-income housing policy: letting private developers,
rather than the government, build the housing.69
1968 was an irqportant year for low-income housing policy.
A variety of forces had converged to make it certain that the
public housing program, the major low-income housing program
since 1937, would be replaced.70 1968 was also an election
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year in which Senator Robert Kennedy was running for presi-
dent. The Senator chose to make part of his platform a pro-
posal for a new low-income housing program based on new, more
generous tax provisions to attract private developers into
the business of providing low-income housing.7 LBJ, presum-
ably advised by Assistant Secretary Surrey, opposed the plan.
Although Robert Kennedy failed to get his proposed
program enacted, the tax expenditure approach was recommended
by President Johnson's Task Force on Housing (the Kaiser
Commission)72 and eventually was built into the 1968 Housing
and Urban Development Act.73 Title IX of the Act, which
established the National Housing Partnerships (NHP), did not
provide any additional tax benefits for low-income housing.
Instead, it set up a legal structure designed to attract
private money into low-income housing by utilizing pre-existing
tax benefits, those in common use as part of the real estate
tax shelter described above. NHP mobilized for low-income
housing the process of syndication that had grown up sponta-
neously in the late 1960s.' Syndication allowed a developer to
profit by the real estate tax shelter as follows. A developer
using the new Section 236 program established under the 1968
Housing Act could (incredibly enough) develop a $1,000,000
building with only $10,000 of his own capital. 4 However,
many developers don't have enough income against which to set
off all their depreciation deductions. Syndication creates
a legal and financial structure that allows developers to
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profit from these tax benefits by selling them to outside
investors who do have the income they want to "shelter"
by means of the deductions.75 The investors profit just as
did the investor in the first example; the developer's profits
are the amount paid him by the investors in return for the
shelter. Since the entire mortgage (not just the equity
capital) can be depreciated, benefits are high enough to
make the deal profitable for each party.
The tax reformers had won the first round in the sense
that NHP used extant tax provisions; no new incentives were
enacted. If tax reformers prevailed in the Housing Act,
however, the second group was to win a major victory (of
all places) in the TRA of 1969. The TRA contained three
provisions designed to enhance the desirability of investment
in low- and moderate-income housing. By far the most impor-
tant of these, both from the point of view of the magnitude
of the tax benefits offered and from the viewpoint of its
tax reform opponents, was the controversial Section 167(k)
provision, which allows for a five-year write-off of capital
investment in substantially rehabilitated housing projects
for low-income tenants. 76
Section 167(k) is one of the new breed of tax expendi-
tures, resembling Surrey's 1961 investment tax credit, in
that it is a tax expenditure enacted with the clear under-
standing that its goals are social goals independent of the
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basic revenue goal of the tax code. Section 167(k) is
a trope on accelerated depreciation, in that it allows an
eligible developer to deduct one-fifth of his development
expenses each year for five years. It was clearly designed
for syndication -- virtually no developer could use the
massive deductions by himself. In the case of a $1,000,000
building, the developer would have $200,000 worth of deduc-
tions to sell for each of five years.
Although Section 167(k) was (and is) the most contro-
versial, it was only one of three provisions in the 1969 TRA
designed to benefit low- and moderate-income housing. 77
The first of the two others was the retention of pre-TRA
depreciation rules for housing projects constructed before
1975 and financed by one of the programs designed to attract
private developers into low- and moderate-income housing
.78production. These rules provided for recapture of deprecia-
tion in excess of straight-line on a declining basis only up
to the tenth year, after which if the building was sold, there
was no recapture at all.
The final provision benefiting low-income housing was
similar to the capital gains provision for homeowners. It
provided that an owner would not be taxed on the proceeds of
the sale of qualifying low- or moderate-income housing to
the extent that the proceeds of the sale were re-invested in
similar qualifying housing.79
Surrey has provided a succinct version of the tax
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reformers' answer to those who would solve the tax expenditure
problem by adopting new tax expenditures to help the poor.
In insisting that a certain tax expenditure be abolished, he
stated in Pathways:
If [other taxpayers] are still able to escape
tax, the proper effort is to seek further re-
finement of remedies to reach those still
escaping....But the argument "Don't stop to
catch me since the other fellow is escaping"
simply means that everyone continues to escape.
Tax reform lies in not postponing efforts to
block some escape until all the exits are
sealed, but in systematically sealing off one
exit after another. As this is done, attention
is focused on the exits still open, the unfair-
ness they present is more glaring, and, as a
consequence, greater imagination, ingenuity
and effort are brought to bear on those exits.80
c. Tax reform since 1969
Tax reform issues remain largely as they were defined
in the late 1960s. Each side of the tax expenditure debate
succeeded in enacting some of its provisions into the TRA
of 1976.81
The tax reformers continued their assault on deprecia-
tion. Their principal victories were in the area of recapture.
The 1976 Act eliminated the 1969 provisions exempting resi-
dential property from the new, stricter recapture rules, and
made all residential properties except subsidized housing
subject to full recapture.82 In addition, the 1976 TRA cut
back on the tax benefits incident to the treatment of con-
struction-period interest and taxes, providing that only a
portion of such interest and taxes may be deducted initially,
with the balance amortized over periods of up to ten years.83
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Tax benefits for low-income housing remained, but they
were reduced. The holding period necessary to avoid recap-
ture was increased substantially. Low-income housing was
made subject to the rules that the TRA of 1969 applied to
all residential real estate.84 Low-income housing was made
subject to the new rules concerning construction period
interest beginning in 1982.85 In addition, Section 167 (k),
originally enacted in a five-year limitation, was extended
until 1978.86 (It has since been extended again.)87 Certain
technical problems were also cleared up that had arisen with
regard to Section 167(k). 8 8
However, the most spectacular recent reform effort was
the Treasury's sudden move in early 1977 to eliminate all
syndication, via an administrative ruling.89 This move,
which was rescinded before it ever was put into effect9 0
is indicative of the strength of the pure tax reform message
in certain bureaucratic domains.
Those who want to adapt tax expenditures to social goals
also achieved a substantial victory in 1976, through the
enactment of the historic preservation provisions, which pro-
vide a comprehensive set of tax incentives for the rehabi-
litation of specified "certified historic structures," linked
with tax disincentives for developers who tear down such
properties.92 The best-known provision, Section 191, is
modeled on Section 167(k), and provides for a five-year
write-off of expenses incurred for rehabilitation.
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4. The budget reform context
In the seventies the primary impetus for reform of
tax expenditures has moved from tax to budget reformers.
Surrey noted in 1976
it is quite interesting to see that Congress
-- or more accurately the Ways and Means Com-
mittee and a group of Senators -- is the only 93body really pushing [for reform of tax expenditures].
In the 1960s the Treasury was far ahead of the
Congress. In the 1970s the Congress is far ahead
of the Treasury.9 4
One major reason for the shift in the locus of power
from tax to budget reformers is an institutional one. At a
time when the Treasury, which had led the fight for tax
reform during the Johnson years, had lost interest in pushing
major tax reforms under the Nixon administration, the Con-
gressional Budget Act of 1974 was setting up an alternative
bureaucracy in the Democratic Congress. The Act created
Committees of the Budget in both the House and the Senate,
as well as a budget office that constituted a major staff
operation.95 In addition to creating the staffing and the
power base for a renaissance of tax expenditure reform, the
Act also gave to the Budget Committees a specific mandate
to "devise methods of coordinating tax expenditures, policies
and programs with direct budget outlays. ,96
As we have seen,97 the tax expenditure concept originally
was formulated as a way to highlight all expenditures, direct
and indirect, in the process of making budget cuts. In this
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initial budget context, Surrey was not opposed to tax expendi-
tures per se. His focus was not on singling out tax expendi-
tures or on changing them into direct subsidies, but on
abolishing those that could not be justified as expenditures.
The tax expenditure concept changed in important ways as
it moved from a budget- to a tax-reform context (which it did
very soon after it was introduced). From a tax-reform
perspective, tax expenditures were singled out because they
eroded the equity of the Internal Revenue Code. The initial
budgetary focus on abolishing unjustifiable tax expenditure
programs was changed, since tax-reform goals could be
achieved either by abolishing tax expenditures or by "trans-
lating" them into direct subsidies.
The tax expenditure concept changed again as it moved
from a tax-reform context to the new budget-reform context.
The two major shifts in focus are well illustrated in the
CBO's Real Estate Tax Shelter Subsidies and Direct Subsidy
Alternatives.
First, as the CBO study makes clear, the shift from
tax- to budget-reform entails a shift in focus away from tax
equity back to that classic budgetary concern, saving money.
The first criterion used by the CBO study to evaluate alterna-
tive programs is cost,98 followed closely by efficiency,
which is also focused on cost: "[a] subsidy is efficient if
it does what it is supposed to do at the lowest possible
cost." 9 9 Tax equity, always first on tax reformers' minds,
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now appears toward the end of the list,100 followed by
visibility and controllability,101 another traditional
budgetary concern. 10 2 In the context of tax reform, tax
expenditure analysis had often used the budgetary concern
for cost efficiency and visibility of expenditures to
re-enforce tax equity goals;103 but tax equity goals had
clearly predominated. In the CBO study, by contrast, the
budget-reform goals clearly come first.
The second major shift in focus illustrated by the CBO
study is a subtle one. On one level, the study stays very
close to the tax reformers' goal of either translating tax
expenditures into direct subsidies or abolishing them
completely. But while tax reformers focused most of their
energies on attacking tax expenditures, the CBO study takes
for granted that a tax expenditure format is undesirable and
concentrates on the issue of how to translate the tax
shelter into a non-tax expenditure program. 104
The CBO study illustrates the kind of analysis that
must back up a translation of the tax shelter into a direct
subsidy. However, it becomes clear that the new budget-
reform version of tax expenditure analysis involves a re-
evaluation and restructuring of housing programs: in short,
it involves housing policy reform. This potentiality was
already apparent to Surry in Pathways:
[Tax expenditure analysis] means examining a
program of financial assistance to a particular
group to decide whether that assistance should
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be given, in what amount, and on what terms.
It really is not tax reform but "expenditure
reform," and the issues and answers to be
explored require different premises and
different experts.105
Tax expenditure analysis in the new budget-reform context
requires a rethinking of the entire expenditure pattern of
which tax expenditures are a part. And, as Surrey also
notes, those who most qualified to do this are neither tax
nor budget experts but, in the case of real estate tax
shelters, housing experts.
Unfortunately, housing analysts have not picked up this
challenge. The three major published efforts by housing
policy analysts to come to terms with the tax expenditure
argument react only to the tax reform version of the tax
expenditure argument. One adopts the tax reformers' view.
The study of Federal Income Tax in Relation to Housing
commissioned by President Johnson's Commission on Urban
Problems in 1968
concedes at the outset a strong presumption
against the use of the "backdoor" or tax route
to public aid for this or similar causes.
Readiness to mulct the tax structure for
good purposes too often represents unwilling-
ness to calculate the dollar costs, to escape
habitual modes of thinking and examine creative
alternatives, or to count the consequences to
the vitality of the Nation's revenue system. 106
Not surprisingly, the report recommends against the use of
tax expenditures to solve the problem of slum housing. Another
prominent analyst, Henry Aaron, also adopted the tax reformers'
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viewpoint, but he focused on the need to abolish not real
estate tax shelters (which benefit, among other things,
housing for the poor), but homeowner deductions (most of
the benefit of which goes to the nonpoor).107 This repre-
sents a logical meshing of the tax and housing viewpoints,
since homeowner deductions are bad policy from each perspec-
tive. The third major effort -- examples of which appear in
the 1973 National Housing Policy Reviewl08 -- opposes the
tax reformers' efforts to abolish tax expenditures by pre-
senting an impressive series of studies designed to show
that abolishing tax expenditures without substituting alter-
native policies would have a devastating effect on housing
markets. 10 9
Outside of these three studies, the tax expenditure
argument has not been approached very analytically in housing
circles. In most cases, the attitude of housing experts
towards a given tax expenditure program has been determined
by whether or not they support the policy approach of which
the particular program is a part. Those who support the
present production subsidy approach to low-income housing
join HUD in defending existing tax subsidies as required by
the political facts of life surrounding housing, whatever
may be the tax or budgetary consequences of such programs.110
Others, chiefly those who advocate housing allowances, join
tax and budget reformers in decrying the shelters as wasteful
and inefficient, and cite them as evidence df why low-income
111
housing policy should abandon its present course.
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The CBO study illustrates why housing analysts cannot
afford to use the tax expenditure argument merely as a debating
point. The study is designed to be used as the basis for
Congressional action on reform of housing programs. Yet its
definition of the major issues in housing policy is seriously
skewed from a housing policy standpoint. The study defines
as the major low-income housing policy issue the question of
what funding format the subsidy presently given as tax shelter
should take. This approach focuses attention and political
energy away from much more basic housing policy issues. As
will be discussed in Section IIA, the tax shelter is only one
of six types of federal subsidy involved in the roccoco struc-
ture of low-income housing finance today. A focus on
changing the funding format of one of these six subsidies
begs the question of whether the overall structure of low-
income housing expenditures should be changed, either 1) by
switching to a production subsidy that uses a more straight-
forward financing approach, or 2) by abandoning production
subsidies altogether in favor of a "demand-side" housing
allowance strategy.
By focusing political attention on tax shelters, the
CBO study embodies an assumption that housing reform attention
should be focused first on low-income housing programs.
This implicit choice, made by Congress in the way it defined
its mandate to the CBO, derives from the tax-reform tradition
of defining the abolition of real estate tax shelters as a
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major priority. Yet the choice to focus only on tax shelters
-- expected to cost $400 million11 2 in FY 1981 -- without even
considering the money C$13.8 billion)113 spent on another tax
expenditure 60 times as large (homeowner deductions) involves
a distortion of tax expenditure analysis. Until recently,
the strategy of pressing hard on tax shelters while not
pushing at all on homeowner deductions could be defended on
the grounds that tax shelters were more regressive in terms
of their tax beneficiaries, since homeowner deductions gave
large tax benefits to the lower-middle class. But this is
no longer the case: 95% of the tax benefits from homeowner
deductions accrues to taxpayers with incomes over $10,000.
So the traditional tax-reform priority of concentrating on
tax shelters because homeowner deductions are less regressive
is no longer valid, since both measures are now seriously
regressive. The focus therefore must shift from the tax to
the housing beneficiaries of both measures. Once it does,
reform of homeowner deductions becomes a central housing
policy concern because of the huge amounts of money involved.
Tax reformers traditionally have defended their focus on
tax shelters by saying that a challenge to homeowner deduc-
tions would get nowhere in Congress. But now that homeowner
deductions have become another instance of "socialism for
the rich" this "political reality" may well have changed. In
the light of new conditions, the old tax-reform stragegy
of concentrating political energy on tax shelters while
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ignoring homeowner deductions seems merely a case of
misplaced priorities, especially when presented as a defini-
tion of the major issues in reform of housing programs. This
analysis of homeowner deductions is presented in Section II.B.
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Section II: Critique of the CBO Study as a Tool for
Restructuring Housing Programs
Real Estate Tax Shelter Subsidies and Direct Subsidy
Alternatives performs the tax it sets out for itself with
thoroughness and rigor. The following critique focuses not
on the CBO's execution, but on the way the CBO study defined
(and had defined for it by the Congress) the task of
mobilizing tax expenditure analysis to restructure lower-
income housing programs.
The CBO study embodies the traditional form of tax
expenditure analysis developed in the context of tax- and
budget-reform. This Section argues that traditional tax
expenditure analysis has severe limitations when used as the
basis for a restructuring of housing programs. If the goal
is to restructure housing programs, tax expenditure analysis
must be melded with housing policy analysis -- a melding
that was not so necessary when tax expenditure analysis was
presented merely as tax- and budget-reform. In the new
context it is necessary to consider not only the tax bene-
ficiaries and the budget impact of an isolated tax expenditure,
but also to consider whether the tax expenditure is part of
a general policy approach (i) that hinders achievement of
tax- and budget-reform goals, and (ii) that constitutes bad
housing policy in terms of its impact on housing beneficiaries.
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A. The CBO Study's treatment of tax expenditures that
benefit lower-income housing
The CBO's approach in Real Estate Tax Shelter Subsidies
and Direct Subsidy Alternatives stays very close to the
version of tax expenditure analysis developed in the context
of tax reform. The study in fact grows out of a dispute that
derives from tax reformers' strategy in the Tax Reform Acts
of 1969 and 1976. In those acts, tax reformers made consider-
able headway toward their goal of abolishing real estate tax
shelters. At the time of the 1976 Act, however, HUD expressed
concern that abolishing all tax shelters would cripple produc-
tion of lower-income housing.11 5 Congress therefore abstained
from abolishing tax shelters that benefit lower-income housing
and commissioned the CBO study to examine programs that could
substitute for tax shelters in the future.11 6
The study also adopts the tax reformers' approach of
considering tax expenditures out of the housing context in
which they occur. The study focuses on one set of tax expen-
ditures -- the tax shelter -- and examines whether it can
be translated into a "direct subsidy alternative." While
the study formulates its tack as examining only direct
subsidy alternatives, in fact it evaluates a number of alter-
natives that do not involve direct subsidies (tax credits and in-
terest subsidies). The fact that it formulates its task as
examining only direct subsidy alternatives again shows a tax
reform perspective. Moreover, the study comes to a good tax
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reform conclusion, rating as the most favorable alternative1 1 7
a direct subsidy from HUD to developers. The grant would
provide a substitute for the syndication benefits derived from
the tax shelter, since syndication proceeds now are used to
provide the developer with an up-front fee for his services.
Translating the real estate tax shelter benefiting low-
income housing into a direct grant would improve the shelter
from the standpoint of traditional tax-reform goals.11 8
First, the translation would improve tax equity, since the
grant would eliminate the regressive tax benefits on which
the tax shelter is based. The translation would also improve
the shelter from the standpoint of the budgetary concerns
traditionally linked with "tax expenditure" tax reform:
visibility of expenditures and cost efficiency. The expendi-
ture involved in a direct grant to builders undoubtedly
would be easier to identify and calculate than the expenditure
involved in the present tax shelter approach. Moreover,
two forms of cost-inefficiency inherent in the tax shelter
would be eliminated. A direct grant would eliminate the
inefficiency inherent in a syndication approach, which, by
giving the builder his profit via syndication, creates a
structure inolving two sets of middlemen -- the investors and
the syndicator. So for each dollar that goes to the builder,
the Treasury must pay a higher sum -- the difference being
the investors' and syndicators' profits. A second source
of cost-inefficiency derives from the fact that current tax
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shelters involve deductions. Syndicators Cto ensure that
all the shelter is sold) normally must price the shelter so
it appeals to taxpayers in the 50% tax bracket. But many
taxpayers buying shelter are in tax brackets higher than
50%, and consequently receive extra shelter at no increase
in price. Their windfall means that although the Treasury
pays them more in the form of tax savings for their parti-
cipation, it receives from them no more in the form of
construction incentive than from a 50% taxpayer. This
inefficiency is impossible to avoid in a shelter based on
depreciation deductions.
The CBO study does not present its proposed reform of
the tax shelter as a tax reform proposal, however: rather,
the reform is presented as a proposed restructuring of low-
income housing subsidies. When examined in this light, the
CBO study has serious limitations.
When the basic goal is tax reform, a narrow focus on
the funding format of an isolated set of tax expenditures
is justifiable. But this narrow focus is not suitable when
the goal is to restructure housing programs. For this a broader
perspective is required: tax shelters must be viewed as an
integral part of an overall expenditure strategy. A focus
on changing the funding format of one of the subsidies
involved (e.g. tax shelters) means that more basic programs
inherent in the strategy are ignored. These basic issues
must be considered if housing programs are to be restructured
to answer tax- and budget-reform concerns.
This Section (in II.A.1) fills in the context119 in
which tax shelters are used by describing the financial
structure of typical lower-income housing projects. This
context shows the inadequacy of a restructuring of housing
expenditures that limits itself to translating the tax
shelter into a direct subsidy by showing that tax shelters
are part of an extraordinarily complex system involving up
to six subsidies, up to three of which involve additional
tax expenditures. The Section (in II.A.2) addresses this
inadequacy. It shows that merely "translating" one of these
six subsidies from a tax expenditure into a direct subsidy
does not fully address tax- and budget-reform concerns because
the overall strategy of which tax shelters are but one part
still would violate basic tax- and budget-reform goals. Tax-
reform goals would continue to be violated in that other
important tax expenditures still would be utilized. Budget-
reform goals would be violated because, even if tax shelters
were changed into direct grants, the subsidies involved still
would be so complex that the strategy as a whole would be
cost-inefficient, while the subsidies that comprise it still
would lack visibility.
The Section then goes on to discuss the major inadequacy
that results from the CBO study's divorce of tax shelters
from their housing policy context, which concerns not tax-
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or budget- but housing policy reform. By focusing exclu-
sively on translating tax shelters, the CBO study defines as
the major issue in restructuring lower-income housing programs
the need to change the funding format of a single type of
housing subsidy. Thus political attention is focused away
from any attempt to evaluate the lower-income housing strategy
as housing policy. Indeed, the desirability of the current
housing strategy seems to be taken for granted. In effect,
the CBO study uses tax expenditure analysis to justify the
status quo. Since the study was commissioned by Congress
to be used in imminent legislative reform, the choice of
tax- and budget-reformers to support the status quo could
have substantial impact on the future of lower-income
housing policy.
The potential impact of the CBO study on housing policy
reform shows why housing experts can no longer afford to use
tax expenditure analysis merely as a debating point. More-
over, tax- and budget-reformers must recognize that if they
propose to restructure housing (or other expenditure programs)
to meet their tax and budget goals, they must meld their
tax expenditure analysis with housing policy analysis, rather
than making housing policy choices that are either hidden or
inadvertant.
This section ends (II.A.3) with a sketch of how tax
expenditure analysis, instead of being used to support the
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status quo, could be used to support the need for change
in housing policy. Two alternative ways of restructuring
housing policy are examined that would improve housing
programs from the standpoint of tax-, budget- and housing
policy goals.
1. The context in which tax shelters are used: the six
types of subsidy available for a typical lower-income
housing project
120
The six types of subsidy to lower-income housing
reflect the complexity of the financial structure of multi-
family housing projects (see Figure 1.). The first subsidy
. .121 122is a direct one, Section 8. Section 8 appropriations
are voted each year, and are allocated by region according
to HUD standards. Section 8 funds are made available to
private developers, state housing finance agencies, and others
in the form of Section 8 commitments. To get a Section 8
commitment, a developer must present a proposed low-income
project. If the project is funded, its developers receive
a commitment by HUD to pay for up to 40 years the difference
between the rent that an eligible (i.e. low-income) tenant
is required to pay (around 25% of his income) and the market
rental of the tenant's apartment.
Once a developer has a Section 8 commitment, he will
begin to assemble debt financing. This can be done in either
of two ways: through conventional mortgage financing or
through so-called "11(b) bonding."1 2 3
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Figure 1: the six subsidies
project
CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE OPTION
#1. Section 8 (Section 202
funds may be combined
with Section 8)
direct subsidy(ies)
#2. Construction loan: may
invoTve federal subsidy
if provided by SHFA.
tax expenditure
Permanent loan:
#3. FHA guarantee:
credit subsidy
#4(a) GNMA interest subsidy:
direct subsidy
OR
#4(b) SHFA interest subsidy:
tax expenditure
#5 Tax shelter:
tax expenditures
involved in a typical Section 8
SECTION 11(b) BONDING
#1. Section 8 (Section 202)
direct subsidy(ies)
Construction-loan:
#2. GNMA guarantees of mortgage-
backed bonds: credit subsidy
#3. Tax exemption given to bank
on the construction loan:
tax expenditure.
Permanent loan:
#4. Section 11(b) bonds are tax-
exempt municipal bonds:
tax expenditure
#5. FHA guarantee: credit subsidy
#6. Tax shelter:
tax expenditures
SHFA = state housing finance agency
For enumeration of subsidies see text. Credit subsidies
are discussed more fully in Section III.
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If conventional mortgage financing is used, the developer
(as he would in any sort of real estate development) will
need both a construction and a permanent loan. The construction
loan is a short-term loan (normally under 2 years) that pro-
vides the money needed to construct (or do substantial
rehabilitation of) the building. Because the loan collateral
(the building) is not in existence when the loan is given,1 24
this is a risky loan. It is therefore expensive -- a construc-
tion loan on the conventional market from a commercial bank
is normally several percentage points above the prime rate.
In some states, however, a developer working with a state
housing finance agency can get a somewhat cheaper construction
loan through that agency, which can raise money more cheaply
than can the conventional loan market because the state
finance agency can issue tax-exempt bonds.125 Every time a
state agency issues tax-exempt bonds, the federal Treasury
loses tax dollars it otherwise Would receive if the bonds
were taxable, (i.e. the Treasury makes a tax expenditure).
Thus this is the second source of federal subsidy to a project
involving conventional debt financing.
Once the project is fully constructed, it is in the
developer's interest to pay off the construction loan as soon
as possible and replace it with a lower-interest loan.
(Once the building is completed, it is worth the amount of
the loan; a lower interest loan will be available since less
risk is involved.) Thus the developer replaces the construc-
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tion loan with a "permanent loan" at a lower interest rate,
usually from a savings and loan or an insurance company. The
third and fourth forms of federal subsidy available to a
project using conventional debt financing are used to lower
the cost of the permanent loan. The third is Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance, available under
Section 221(d) (3) and 221(d)(4). The mortgage insurance
commits the federal government to repay the mortgage lender if
the developer fails to do so. This transferring of risk
from the mortgage-holder to the government ordinarily makes
the mortgage-holder willing to lend money at a somewhat
lower rate. The size of the subsidy is determined by complex
calculations of the amount of risk transferred to the
government. 126
The fourth federal subsidy also reduces the cost of the
permanent loan. Two different approaches are available:
either the state housing finance agency offers permanent as
well as construction financing via tax-exempt bonds, or the
Government National Mortgage Corporation (GNMA) ("Ginnie Mae")
offers an alternative source of subsidy. GNMA is a secondary
mortgage market institution that works both to subsidize eli-
gible permanent loans and to make mortgage money more readily
available in times of shortage.127 The secondary mortgage
market consists of financial institutions that buy and sell
permanent mortgage loans. GNMA combines this function with a
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system for subsidizing certain types of mortgages. The
subsidies derive from the fact that GNMA buys at or near
face value mortgages that -- either because they are risky
or because they carry lower-than-market interest rates --
are worth less than face value.128 Of course, the difference
between what GNMA pays for the mortgage and its worth on
the market constitutes a federal subsidy.
In the place of conventional mortgage financing, a
developer can chooseto raise the money needed to cover the
mortgage through "11(b) bonding." Section ll(b) of the
housing act simply gives a private developer of low-income
housing direct access to a municipality's ability to issue
tax-exempt bonds. The actual financial structure set up
when 11(b) bonding is used is bizarre. Take the case of a
$6 million project.129 The developer goes to a municipal
agency (call it the "Housing Agency"), with his proposed
project. The agency, if it accepts the proposal, sets up a
legal entity (call it the "Housing Agency Bonding Corpora-
tion") which it authorizes to issue its tax-exempt municipal
bonds. The bond issue proceeds, but meanwhile the developer
needs a construction loan, since the bond proceeds can be used
for financing only after the collateral (the building) is in
place.130 So the Housing Agency Bonding Corporation borrows
$6 million131 for the construction loan from a commercial bank;
under federal law the bank is excused from paying federal income
taxes on any income it receives as a result of that loan.
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Meanwhile, of course, the developer is also paying the
interest on the $6 million bond issue. He is therefore paying
interest on $12 million, twice the amount he actually needs
for the building. To limit his interest costs somewhat, he
invests the $6 million worth of bond proceeds in government-
guaranteed securities until the building construction is
completed and the money is needed for the permanent loan.
The third, fourth and fifth forms of federal subsidy involved
in a Section 11(b) project, then, flow from 3) the tax
exemption given to the commercial bank on the construction
loan, 4) the tax exemption for the municipal bonds, and 5)
the government guarantees for the investment in securities.
The final type of federal subsidy given to a typical
low-income housing project today is the tax shelter. In
theory, the shelter helps developers raise equity money
needed to attract a mortgage; in fact, the proceeds from
syndication provide an up-front fee for the developer.
2. Inadequacy of the CBO study's "translation" approach
By focusing political attention on the funding format
of one of the six subsidies used in lower-income housing
projects, the CBO study in effect endorses the present housing
strategy. This passive endorsement derives from the narrow
translation approach of tax expenditure analysis developed
in the context of tax reform. It made sense for tax reformers
to focus on tax expenditures one by one32 , and to concentrate
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on translating into direct subsidies those they
could not simply abolish. This approach no longer makes
sense, however, now that tax expenditure analysis is being
used by budget reformers, not for tax reform but as the ba-
sis for restructuring housing programs.
a. Impact of the CBO study's translation approach; tax
and budget goals
The first drawback of the CBO study's narrow translation
approach derives from the fact that it concentrates not on
the current low-income housing strategy considered as a whole,
but on some of the individual programs that comprise that
strategy. This inability to see the forest through the
trees means that, even if one individual tax-expenditure
program (the tax shelter) was translated into a direct sub-
sidy, the overall low-income housing strategy of which tax
shelters are but one constituent part still would not meet
either tax- or budget-reform goals. Tax-reform goals would
not be met because housing projects would continue to employ
a range of tax expenditures. The most important of these is
the subsidy that derives from the sale of tax-exempt munici-
pal bonds. The size of this expenditure dwarfs that for
tax shelters: in 1978, $600 million133 was spent on muni-
cipal bonds, whereas only $150 millionl34 was spent on tax
shelters, that benefited low-income projects.
Even if tax shelters were translated into direct subsi-
dies, the present low-income housing strategy would continue
to rate very low from the perspective of the budget-reform
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goals of visibility of expenditures and cost efficiency.
Even if the tax shelter were translated into a direct subsi-
dy, lower-income housing projects still would utilize so
many complex and hidden subsidies that virtually no one ex-
cept real estate developers and their accountants, bankers
and lawyers would be able to understand the amount of govern-
ment funds involved. Moreover, the "mix and match" character
of the various subsidies would continue to make it extraor-
dinarily difficult to calculate the cost efficiency of the
current housing strategy as a whole, or of any particular
combination of subsidies. Figure 2 illustrates that it is
possible to combine different housing subsidies into over
twenty permutations. In order to calculate the average cost
per unit of any one of these permutations, one would need
calculations of the amount of subsidy used from each of the
various funding sources (e.g. Section 8, tax shelters, etc.).
No such figures exist or are likely ever to exist; therefore,
detailed calculations of cost efficiency are impossible.1 3 5
Yet the description in II.A.l. points to massive cost inef-
ficiencies in many of the possible permutations: for example,
in projects using Section 11(b) bonding, a developer must
borrow and pay interest on loans for twice the actual cost
of his housing project.
A different aspect of the inefficiency of the present
housing strategy stems from the fact that very substantial
direct expenses and time delays (which cause further expense)
result because so many sources of funding must be applied for
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Figure 2: low-income housing production subsidy programs
Section 8: New construction/substantial rehabilitation:
basic format: Section 8, subsidy construction
loan, permanent loan, FHA mort-
gage insurance, tax shelter
6 basic permutations
#1. new construction
Section 8
market rate construction loan
GMNA permanent loan
FHA mortgage insurance
tax shelter - acc. dep.
#3. new construction
Section 8
SHFA construction loan
GNMA permanent loan
FHA mortgage insurance
tax shelter - acc. dep.
#2. Subst. rehab.
same
same
same
tax shelter-167(k)
#4. Subst. rehab.
same
same
same
tax shelter-167 (k)
#5. new construction #6. Subst. rehab.
Section 8
11(b) bonding same
(entails: market-rate
construction loan
GMNA guarantee of mortgage-
backed bonds
tax-exempt bonds to finance
permanent mortgage)
FHA mortgage insurance same
tax shelter-acc. dep. tax shelter-167(k)
Section 236: 8 basic permutations:
Basic format same as under Section 8: permutations #1-#4
(tax-exempt bond financing of permanent mortgage not avail.)
Two programs: Sect. 236 alone, and Sect. 236 combined with
rent supplements.
Section 202: 6 basic permutations:
Can be combined with Section 8.
Public housing: 1 basic permutation:
Basic format: tax-exempt bonding finances debt service
government guarantees of those bonds
operating subsidies
Other programs: Section 235: Rural Housing Insurance and
subsidies:
community development block grants.
N.B. Only federal subsidies are included. Virtually all
projects also receive local property tax forgiveness.
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and coordinated in a single program. If the recommendation of
the CBO study -- that the proposed builders' credit should be
granted automatically -- were implemented, the situation would
not be made worse, but neither would it be improved, since all
the requirements surrounding Section 8 and either conventional
or Section 11(b) financing would remain.
b. Impact of the CBO study's translation approach on housing
reform
Now that tax expenditure analysis is being used by budget
reformers to restructure housing programs, a new version of tax
expenditure analysis must be developed. Tax expenditure analysis
must be melded with housing policy analysis: two combinations
suggest themselves, and they will be discussed below. But first
it is necessary to provide a brief sketch of the current lower-
income housing strategy and of the role tax expenditures play
in it.
1) The role of tax expenditures in a lower-income housing stra-
tegy based on "passive intervention" production subsidies
The present approach to lower-income housing was institu-
ted in the mid-1960s; it was the first major overhaul in low-
income housing programs since 1937. From 1937 - 1965 public
housing had been the primary program for channeling government
subsidies into low-income housing. The public housing program
was an "active intervention" approach, in which the government
itself built and owned the housing. The local public housing
authority acted as its own developer, hiring its own architect
and contractor; its own banker, raising mortgage mo-
ney through municipal bonds; and its
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own manager of the buildings after completion.
In sharp contrast to the low-income public housing
program, middle-income housing programs left intact the system
of private actors involved in residential construction. In
the middle-income programs, the government neither built nor
managed the housing; it merely provided support and subsidy
to private actors, who produced the desired housing through
the market. FHA mortgage insurance, VA mortgage guarantees,
the secondary mortgage market and homeowner deductions all
are examples of this "passive intervention" approach. 13 6
In the mid-1960s, low income housing programs were re-
evaluated as a result of the new focus on poverty that also
simultaneously affected tax policy. 13 7 At the time of this
re-evaluation, consensus was that, while public housing was
a "dreary deadlock" and a dismal failure,138 the passive
intervention programs for the middle class had been impres-
sively successful.139 The reaction was to apply the passive
intervention approach to low-income housing. A series of
programs replaced local public housing authorities with private
developers and/or landlords in 1965.14 But the line of pro-
grams that was to develop into the major thrust of low-income
housing policy after 1968 began with the Section 221(d) (3)
rent supplement program. 4 Section 221(d) (3) originally
was an interest subsidy program which completely eliminated
the local housing authorities. It provided for private
developers to build housing for the lower-middle class,
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offering 3% 40-year loans in a 6% 20-year market.142 When
Congress decided to retarget Section 221 (d) (3) to the poor,
it was quickly discovered that even with interest subsidies,
it was not economic for developers to rent Section 221(d)(3)
projects at prices the poor could afford. To remedy this,
rent supplements were passed, providing direct subsidies to
be used to make up the difference between 25% of eligible
tenants' incomes and the actual project rent. The rent
supplements, however, were not passed without an uproar that
astonished most observers then and has ever since.143 As
Henry Aaron remarked dryly in 1973, "[t]he program has not been
a Congressional pet." Very few units of rent supplement
housing have ever been built.1 44
Consequently, when the second generation of passive inter-
vention programs targeted to the poor was developed, the rent
supplement approach was abruptly dropped. Instead, the
Great Society programs, Section 235 and Section 236,145 offered
a larger interest subsidy: they provided for 1% loans in a
6.5% market.146 Even with the interest subsidy, however, still
more subsidy was needed to make the housing economically
feasible. In Section 236 projects 7 this gap was filled by
tax subsidies, channeled through the tax shelter. Syndica-
tion of tax benefits quickly became the norm in Section 236
projects, once given an initial push by the National Housing
Partnerships enacted simultaneously with Section 236.148 In
1969, of course, Section 167(k) offered a 5-year write-off
of rehabilitation expenditures that gave some projects
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access to more tax shelter than ever. 149 In effect, then,
tax expenditures replaced rent supplements in propping up the
passive intervention approach to low-income housing.
The alliance between developers and low-income housing
advocates that resulted from the shift to a passive interven-
tion approach proved so successful that, once Section 235 and
Section 236 were geared up, production boomed. In the five
years between 1969 and 1973, as many federally subsidized
units were built as were built in the previous 34 years.150
This boom ended abruptly with Nixon's moratorium on housing
programs in 1973.151
During the upheaval that followed, Section 236 was
transformed into Section 8. Section 8 represents a complete
abandonment of the interest subsidy,152 and in theory repre-
sents an abandonment of the underlying assumption that
governmental intervention in low-income housing should take
the form of subsidies for production of new housing.153
Section 8 offers increases in both direct and indirect
subsidies. The direct subsidy, determined as the difference
between the rents paid by eligible low-income tenants (about
25% of their income) and the market rent of the project,
normally is higher than the subsidy that would have been
available under a Section 236 interest subsidy.15 4
Indirect subsidies also multiplied. While a typical
Section 236 project used only the Section 236 interest subsidy,
FHA guarantees and the tax shelter,155 the typical Section
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8 project utilizes up to five different forms of indirect
subsidy in addition to Section 8 funds.156 The most important
of the indirect subsidies made available to Section 8 projects
is the interest subsidy, which is not as large as that used
in Section 236, but is offered in addition to Section 8.
Two types of interest subsidy are given by means of tax sub-
sidies. First, Section 11(b),157 enacted simultaneously with
Section 8, gives Section 8 projects access to subsidized
mortgage money by allowing the mortgage loan to be financed
through tax-exempt bonding.
Second, state housing finance agencies have become
much more effective as conduits of federal tax subsidies.
Prior to 1973, most state agencies had not yet been very
active because they were just starting up: only 11 had issued
any bonds at all as of 1973.158 By now many more state housing
finance agencies have come of age, as is evident by the dates
of their founding: only one existed before 1960; 11 more
were established in the late 1960s; 14 more between 1970
and 1972; in 1973, state housing finance agency legislation
was pending in 10 states.15 9
The third type of interest subsidy is channeled not
through tax-exempt bonds but through the secondary mortgage
market. A Section 8 project can receive a subsidized mortgage
through GMNA, which would (for example) commit itself to buy
a 7.5%160 mortgage in 1978 when the market interest rate
was about 9%. 161
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No comprehensive figures exist to document the rise
in subsidy per unit of each successive passive intervention
program. Those figures that do exist for production subsidy
programs seriously underestimate their costs, since large
proportions of all projects have defaulted (or can be expected
to do so in the future).162 Upon default, FHA guarantees
require the federal government to pay off the bank holding the
loan and to incur the mortgage liability itself. In effect,
the loan guarantee ordinarily calculated to involve minimal
expense to the federal government becomes a huge federal
subsidy equal to the amount of the mortgage loan. 16 3
Those figures that do exist suggest that cost per
unit has risen consistently.since the passive intervention
approach was introduced. The rent supplement program cost
$1310/unit (1972 dollars) in 1973.164 Section 236 cost
$2500/unit (1973 dollars) in 1973;165 but that excluded all
default costs, and one-fourth of all Section 236 projects have
now defaulted.166 Section 8/New Construction and Rehabilita-
tion projects cost $4000/unit (1976 dollars) in 1976, excluding
any future increase due to defaults.1 67
2) Tax expenditure analysis and reform of low-income housing
programs
Once the translation approach to tax expenditure analy-
sis is discarded in favor of an approach that melds analysis
of tax expenditures and analysis of housing policy, two
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combinations of tax expenditure analysis and housing policy
analysis suggest themselves.
First, tax expenditure analysis could be used to
fine-tune the system of passive intervention production sub-
sidies. The CBO study begins this process, although instead
of the traditional tax reform approach of translating tax
expenditures one by one, the entire system of subsidies needs
to be reassessed and simplified. One major argument in favor
of this fine-tuning approach is the claim that the only way
to obtain enough money for lower-income housing is to retain
the passive intervention approach (so that private bankers
and developers will lobby for it) while hiding the actual
amounts of subsidy involved (to avoid an uproar such as
happened with the rent supplement program).
The other major alternativel69 would be to use tax
expenditure analysis to argue that the present system of
production subsidies should be abandoned. The most per-
sisten.t and articulate opponents of production subsidies are
those who advocate a shift to housing allowances, whereby
truly low-income people would be given an earmarked income
transfer and left to rent housing on the open market.
A shift from production subsidies to a housing al-
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lowance would satisfy the goals of tax expenditure analysis,
since a housing allowance approach would eliminate all ex-
tant tax-expenditure lower-income housing programs. This
is true because the tax expenditures benefiting lower-income
housing have since their inception been related to the capi-
tal formation aspect of housing construction, as the history
of tax expenditures for housing presented in Section I il-
lustrates.170 A switch away from production subsidies would
represent a final abandonment of the effort to adopt policies
developed in a capital formation context to meet welfare
171
goals.
A housing allowance by definition could not be channeled
through the tax system. It would clearly be unsuitable to
offer deductions to potential beneficiaries, since the higher
one's income, the larger the government subsidy offered via
a deduction of a given amount.172 Tax credits would not be
suitable either, since many of the potential housing allowance
beneficiaries would pay such low taxes that a credit would
be worthless to them.17 3 The only feasible tax expenditure
format would be the refundable credit, now being advocated
by Surrey as the second-best solution if a direct subsidy is
not politically possible. 74 A refundable credit housing
allowance, however, would seriously strain the fiction of
using the tax system. In effect, the government would send
housing allowance checks from the Treasury rather than from
HUD; since all the beneficiaries would be low-income and
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would pay only a small amount of taxes, the program would
obviously be a thinly veiled direct subsidy program. Hence,
it is likely that a housing allowance would be in the form
of a direct subsidy; introduction of a housing allowance most
likely would eliminate tax expenditures for low-income hous-
ing in one fell swoop.
Because a shift to housing allowances would eliminate
all extant tax-expenditure programs for lower-income housing,
an alliance between housing allowance proponents and tax
expenditure analysts should appeal to budget reformers. Such
an alliance also should appeal to housing policy analysts who
favor the housing allowance,because a "full accounting" of
all tax expenditures could re-inforce two major arguments
against a production-subsidy approach. Both arguments stem
from the fact that production subsidies require very large
amounts of subsidy per unit. The first argument is that
the high subsidies per unit required by a production subsidy
approach produce horizontal inequity among those eligible for
housing benefits.175 The radical (and constantly growing) mis-
mismatch between what a low-income tenant can afford to pay
and what a new unit costs to build means that a production-
subsidy program must give a large amount of subsidy (in the
form of a new housing unit) to a small proportion of those
eligible for the housing program.
The second argument against production subsidies is that
the same mismatch between the cost of a new unit and low-income
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tenants' incomes also prevents production-subsidy programs from
serving the lowest-income population. In order to make projects
economic, program designers have found is necessary to target
production subsidies to beneficiaries who can pay more rent than
can truly low-income people. Thus in 1977 the median income in
Section 235 housing was $8,085; in Section 236 housing the median
was $6285; in Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehab it was
$4376. 176 By contrast, the average income of people who partici-
pated in programs that utilized existing housing was lower. The
median income of families in Section 8 Existing Housing was
$3506;177 the median income of families who participated in an
experimental housing allowance program was $4000(in 1978). 178
If budget reformers choose to use tax expenditure analysis
to argue in favor of housing allowances, they should be aware
of other major arguments against production subsidies. In addition
to eliminating the problems associated with costs, a shift
away from production subsidies seems to offer the possibility
of targeting money for housing to people with very low
incomes without creating the "problem projects" that had by
the 1970s become a serious urban problem. A thriving litera-
ture documented the syndrome of vandalism and crime that
overtook a very visible percentage of urban "projects."1 79
The literature added new urgency to the claim that the poorest
families should not simply be thrown together.
These considerations were reinforced by a growing con-
viction that production subsidies had important technical
drawbacks. This strain of thought derived from "submarket
analysis," an approach initiated in the early 1960s, 180
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which argued that in order to tell what would be the impact
of producing new housing units, it was necessary to under-
stand the workings of different housing submarkets within
a metropolitan area. For example, if new subsidized units
were produced in a city in which there was already an excess
of low-income housing, the net result might well be the decline
of low-income neighborhoods caused by the abaondonment of
existing housing.
Tax- and budget-reformers should also be aware of major
arguments against the housing allowance. The first is the
claim that because a housing allowance, even if it could ever
be enacted, would be politically more vulnerable than the
present passive intervention programs, lower-income
people would end up with less housing subsidy than ever. The
second criticism involves a technical problem. If the
elasticity of supply of low-income housing is low, then a
large-scale program of housing allowances would serve only
to drive up rents without any substantial increase in the
quality of the housing low-income people could afford. Unfortu-
nately, no study has been able to determine whether the elas-
ticity of low-income housing supply is high or low. 1 81
3. Conclusion
The narrow translation approach used by the CBO study
was suitable when tax expenditure analysis was being used
for tax reform, but it is not suitable as the background for
restructuring housing and other expenditure programs. The
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mandate of the Congressional Budget Act to integrate con-
sideration of tax expenditure and direct subsidy programs
could have an undesirable impact on reform of housing programs
unless the translation approach is replaced with a new form of
tax expenditure analysis that integrates tax- and budaet- with
housing policy-reform goals. In this section we have seen
the way the narrow translation approach distorted the CBO
study's analysis of low-income housing expenditures; the next
section examines how the CBO study in effect focuses attention
away from what ought to be the major focus of tax expenditure
analysis of housing policies because of the study's origins
in the tax reform movement.
B. The CBO study's treatment of the distribution of housing
subsidies between the poor and the nonpoor.
The way the CBO study uses tax expenditure analysis has
serious drawbacks from the standpoint of low-income subsidies.
Unfortunately, these are matched by the study's drawbacks as
a tool for equalizing the allocation of housing subsidies
between the poor and the nonpoor.
As was explained above, the scope of the CBO study --
the decision to concentrate on tax shelters alone -- was
determined by Congress' mandate to the CBO. Congress expressly
from
forbade the CBO considering homeowners deductions. In its
letter directing the CBO to write what became Real Estate
Tax Shelter Subsidies and Direct Alternatives, the Congress
outlined the proposed changes in the tax law then under
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consideration and made oblique reference to HUD's concern
over the impact of tax reforms on lower-income housing produc-
tion. Its instructions to the CBO were as follows:
Accordingly, we believe it would be a helpful
first step for the Congressional Budget office
to undertake a study of possible alternative
or additional rental housing subsidies which
could substitute for existing tax shelter
subsidies. Such a study would not deal with
the separate issue of subsidies for homeowner-
ship, such as the tax deductions for home
mortage interest and property taxes.1 82
This shows clearly the tax reform context in which the
scope of the CBO study was defined. The study grew out of
tax reformers' past successes in attacking the tax shelter.
Congress' mandate to the CBO made explicit the alliance
between political pragmatists and tax reformers in concentra-
ting on tax shelters while carefully avoiding any challenge
to homeowner deductions.
The tax reformers decided to attack tax shelters but
not homeowner deductions (despite the fact that both
are tax expenditures) because they naturally focused on the
distribution of tax expenditure benefits among tax benefici-
aries. And tax shelters had a far more regressive impact on
tax beneficiaries than did homeowner deductions. Figure 3
is a typical tax reform analysis of the impact of tax shelter
and of homeowner deductions. It shows that 40-50% of the
tax benefits from homeowner deductions accrue to taxpayers
with incomes below $10,000, whereas 70% of the tax benefits
from tax shelters accrue to those with incomes above $10,000.
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Figure 3: Tax reformers' analysis of the distribution
of tax beneficiaries of tax shelters* and
homeowner deductions.
Homeowner Deductions
Income Groups Deduction of Deduction of Tax
Mortgage In- Property Shelters
terest Taxes
Less than $5000 6.8% 7.7% 10.4%
$5-10,000 41.4 33.3 21.3
$10-15,000 42.7 43.7 34.1
Over $15,000 9.1 15.3 34.1
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
*
Depreciation on rental housing in excess of straight-
line is used as an approximation of the tax shelter.
Source: S. Surrey and P. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure
and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 18 B.C.
INDUST. and COM. L. REV. 679, 733-6.
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In addition to the fact that tax shelters were more
regressive than were homeowner deductions, tax reformers
recognized that Congress generally considered homeowner deduc-
tions politically unassailable.183 These two considerations
formed the basis of tax reformers' decision to focus reform
efforts on the tax shelter.
The unspoken decision to concentrate on shelters rather
than homeowner deductions made sense when the expenditure
analysis was the preserve of tax reformers. It no longer
makes sense in the new context of budget and housing policy.
If tax expenditure analysis is to be used to restructure
housing programs, attention must focus not only on the tax
beneficiaries of tax expenditure programs but also on those
programs' housing beneficiaries. This change in perspective
changes the evaluation of tax shelters versus homeowner
deductions, since homeowner deductions (although less regres-
sive than tax shelters from the standpoint of tax beneficiaries)
are far more regressive from the standpoint of housing bene-
ficiaries in that they make the overall pattern of housing
expenditures spectacularly regressive. In fact, approximately
80% of federal housing expenditures go to the nonpoor.184
According to the CBO's own figures $10.2 billion went in
FY 1978 for homeowner deductions, 18 5 68 times more than
the $150 million spent for tax shelters to benefit low-income
housing. 186
Tax-reform and housing expenditure-reform perspectives
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diverge most sharply on the issue of how housing benefits
are distributed between the poor and the nonpoor. There-
fore, this is an important issue to address in an attempt
to integrate tax expenditure analysis into an analysis of
housing expenditures (as the basis for restructuring housing
programs). The only recent legislative attempt to reformulate
homeowner deductions was the 1974 proposal of Senator Edward
Kennedy (who is a leading tax reformer in Congress) to trans-
late the mortgage interest deduction into a tax credit.1 87
This proposal is in the mainstream of Surrey's present version
of tax expenditure analysis, which focuses attention on trans-
lating tax expenditures into other tax expenditures with less
regressive impact as a second-best solution when it is judged
politically impossible to abolish the tax expenditure com-
pletely or to turn it into a direct subsidy.188 Translating
the mortgage interest deduction into a tax credit would make
it less regressive in terms of its impact on tax benefici-
aries.189 However, a narrow translation approach would not
address the core housing policy issue involved, since the
mortgage interest subsidy would most likely still constitute
the largest single federal housing program, most of whose
benefits would go to nonpoor beneficiaries (because most of
the poor are renters, not homeowners). 190
A better mesh of tax-, budget- and housing policy-reform
goals would be to mobilize tax and budget reformers' distaste
for homeowner deductions in a longer-term strategy to abolish
the deductions completely. This goal is fast becoming less
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and less impractical because of tax reformers' success in
raising the standard deductionr 9 and because of trends in
housing prices.
Traditionally, federal homeownership policies192 have
been thought of as programs for the middle class, particularly
the lower middle class. Throughout the 1950s the middle and
lower-middle class did receive massive amounts of federal
assistance.193 Partly as a result of this assistance, a
revolution in homeownership took place in the U.S. between
1900 and 1960. In 1900 a relative elite one-third (37%) of
urban households owned their own homes; by 1960 nearly two-
thirds did.19 During approximately the same period, con-
struction of rental units dropped precipitously from 43% of
new dwelling units in 1927 to only 9% in 1955.195 The most
dramatic growth of homeownership was after World War II.
Said one contemporary observer, "The extraordinary growth
of homeownership is one of the outstanding characteristics
of the postwar United States." 196 At the end of the war,
only 16 million nonfarm households owned their own homes
(50% of the population); a decade later in 1956, that number
had doubled to 30 million (60% of the population).197 The
postwar spurt was fueled by capital saved up during the
war and by pent-up demand that had been building up during
the Depression.198 It was helped by two massive governmental
programs focused primarily on the middle- and working-classes:
FHA mortgage insurance and VA mortgage guarantees. One
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estimate is that 35 - 50% of postwar residential construc-
tion (1946 - 1977) was built under the two programs;1 99
a more conservative estimate is 15%.200
Limitations on mortgage size201 ensured that FHA bene-
fited primarily the lower-middle class. In addition, the
subsidies hidden in FHA insurance were small.202 The VA
program, however, had no limitations on mortgage amount,203
and hid very substantial interest-rate subsidies. 20 4
After 1946, when the income tax became a substantial
economic factor, large subsidies began to flow through the
income tax system via homeowner deductions. No figures
exist for the percentage of taxpayers electing homeowner de-
ductions during this period, but it is possible to get an idea
of the number of taxpayers taking homeowner deductions by
counting how many taxpayers elected to itemize rather than
taking the standard deduction.205 In 1964, only 4% of all
taxpayers took the standard deduction,206 and this percentage
stayed relatively constant until 1967. 207
With the onset of the tax reform movement, however,
this percentage began to rise sharply, as tax reformers pushed
successfully for higher standard deductions in an attempt to
encourage people to take the standard deduction.20 8 The
three charts in Figure 4 show the result of the tax reformers'
strategy of raising the standard deduction. In 1969, before
the first Tax Reform Act took effect, roughly half of taxpayers
itemized and half did not (See Chart A). Nearly 20% of
Americans with incomes below $5000 itemized, as did over half
Figure 4*
Chart A: Percentage, distribution, by income groups, of taxpayers who itemize
Income Class
All taxpayers
Below $5000
$5-10O,000
$10-15,000
$15-20,000 or
over $20,000
Over $20,000
19691 19732 19773
Itemized Standardized Itemized Standardized Itemized Standardized
46% 54% 35% 65% 26% 68%
18
53
74
70
82
47
25
10
94
72
51
24
98
92
78
60
27
Chart B: Distribution among income groups of the benefits of itemization
Income Class
Below $5000
$5-10,000
$10-15,000
$15-20,000 or
over $20,000
Over $20,000
19694 19735 19776
Itemized Standardized Itemized Standardized Itemized Standardized
7%
16
13
10
34%
15
5
1
100%
2%
7
10
17
31%
18
10
5
100%
0.5%
1.7
3.5
5.2
15%
21%
21
13
8
6
100%
Chart C: Distribution of tax benefits from homeowner deductions - 1976
Income Class
Under $5000
$5-10,000
$10-15,000
$15-20,000
Over $20,000
Proportion of tax benefits accruing for each income class
0.7%
6
16
24
54
100%
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Sources for Figure 4:
1INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. TREASURY,
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR 1969, 82 (19 )
(hereinafter cited as INDIVIDUAL RETURNS-YEAR).
2 INDIVIDUAL RETURNS 
- 1973, 39.
3 INDIVIDUAL RETURNS - 1977, 34.
4 Calculations based on data from INDIVIDUAL RETURNS - 1969,82.
5Calculations based on data from INDIVIDUAL RETURNS - 1973,39.
6 Calculations based on data from INDIVIDUAL RETURNS - 1977,34.
7 U.S. DEPT. HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HUD STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK - 1977, 348 (Table 15) (1977).
*
Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
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of those with incomes between $5 - 10,000 and nearly three-
fourths of those who earned between $10 - 15,000. In 1973,
four years after the first Tax Reform Act, the proportion of tax-
payers who itemized had dropped to roughly one"third; this
percentage dropped further (to one-fourth) after the' second
Tax Reform Act of 1976. By 1977, the percentage of people
with incomes below $5000 who itemized had falled from 20%
(in 1969) to 2%; the percentage of those with incomes between
$5-10,000 who itemized had fallen from over 50% to 8%; about
20% (down from 75%) of Americans with incomes between $10-25,000
now itemized. Another useful perspective is given by Chart B,
which shows the total percentage of all itemizers that came
from each income group. Chart B shows that whereas in 1969 36%
of the benefits incident to itemizing went to those with
income below $15,000, by 1977 only 6% still did.
Documentation of the number of taxpayers electing home-
owner deductions is available for 1976. This data confirms
that changes in the tax law have meant that the traditional
claim that homeowner deductions benefit the middle and working
class is no longer true. Chart C shows that in 1976 only
0.7% of all returns filed by people with incomes below $5000,
and only 6% of those filed by people with incomes between
$5 - 10,000, took homeowner deductions. Even expanding the
definition of lower-middle class to include people with incomes
below $15,000 scarcely makes homeowner deductions less
regressive, since only 16% of this group claimed these deduc-
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tions. Chart C also shows that nearly 95% of the benefits
of homeowner deductions accrue of taxpayers with incomes over
$10,000 (nearly 80% of those with incomes over $15,000).
The traditional claim that homeowner deductions benefit
primarily the middle and lower-middle class has become
Qbsolete not only because of tax reforms (i.e. rises in the
standard deduction) but also because of recent changes in
the price of single-family homes.209 Sharp rises in housing
prices have meant that the benefits given to an average
beneficiary of the homeowner deductions have increased at
the same time as the base of beneficiaries has constricted.
Figure 5 illustrates the rise in housing prices
since 1968. This price rise has had two effects. First,
it has begun to lock lower-income owners out of the market
for new housing. Whereas close to half of American families
could afford a median-price new home in 1970, by 1970 the
proportion had fallen to one-quarter.210 In addition, the
rise in housing prices has meant that those who can afford
to buy houses now characteristically buy more expensive -
housing in relation to their incomes than had traditionally
been the practice,2 11 because the house is viewed as an
inflation-proof investment. A 1979 study reports:
One of the clearest and most significant
findings pertains to the great role of in-
vestment and related financial considera-
tions in the purchase decisions of 1975
and especially 1977 buyers. Home purchase
as (1) an inflation hedge, (2) an opportu-
nity to capture larger income-tax benefits,
and (3) the "best investment for the money"
ranked very high among the responses [to
surveys taken].212
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Figure 5: Rise in Price of
1968 - 1977.
Single-Family Houses
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SOURCE: L. Grebler & F. Mittelbach, The Inflation of Housing
Prices, p. 17.
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As the study indicates, the availability of homeowner deduc-
tions enhances the attractiveness of investing in housing. 21 3
Moreover, the more expensive the home in relation to the
taxpayer's income, the more valuable are the tax benefits
available: a taxpayer earning $50,000 who deducts $500/month
on an $80,000 home receives greater tax benefits than if the
same taxpayer deducted $300/month on a $50,000 home.21 4
Homeowner deductions are turning into a tax shelter for the
upper-middle class.
When the decline in the numbers of lower-middle class
taxpayers who elect homeowner deductions is combined with
the rise in the amounts deducted by upper-middle class tax-
payers electing the deductions, it becomes clear that the
regressivity of homeowner deductions is increasing sharply.
This fact suggests that the home deductions should now be
much more vulnerable to attack than they traditionally have
been. Tax reformers traditional focus on tax shelters, and
their fatalistic acceptance of homeowner deductions should
be reassessed and the elimination of the mortgage interest
deduction should be a very high priority of tax-, budget-
and housing policy-reform.
Although the time is ripe for reform of the mortgage
interest deduction, an attempt to change the second homeowner
deduction -- the deduction of local property taxes -- presents
additional political problems. It has long been clear that
the homeowner property tax deduction functions to allow
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local governments to transfer their expenses to the federal
government: local governments enact increases in property
taxes while publicly assuring taxpayers that they are in
effect taxing the federal government to pay for local
expenditures.215 The political significance of this fact
was confirmed when recent attacks on the homeowner deduc-
tions met with resistance from a coalition in which munici-
pal governments played a prominent role.216 Any attack
on homeowner deductions therefore should concentrate
initially on the mortgage interest deduction (as did
Senator Kennedy's). A challenge to the property tax deduc-
tion must be preceded by a study that develops a substitute
program that transfers revenue from the federal to local
governments.
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III. From tax expenditure analysis to analysis of
all "backdoor expenditures"
Section II focused on the need to adapt the version
of tax expenditure analysis developed in a tax-reform
context to its new role in restructuring housing programs.
Section III will argue that, when the focus is on reform
of housing programs, tax expenditure analysis has inherent
limitations.
When Surrey introduced the concept of "tax expendi-
tures " in 1967, he did so amidst a good deal of ferment.
As Surrey at the Treasury spoke of "tax expenditures,"
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Wilbur Mills
spoke of "back door spending,"217 and the President's
Commission on Budget Concepts issued its final report.21 8
The Commission on Budget Concepts took the broadest perspec-
tive. Instead of focusing specifically on tax expenditures,
it focused on all three major varieties of "backdoor expen-
ditures": tax expenditures, credit activity, and programs
involving what are now referred to as "uncontrollable"
expenditures. (Expenditures are uncontrollable in programs
that are open-ended or involve fixed costs or long-term
contracts because in such programs Congress does not have the
ability to control program costs in a given year, since prior
commitments require the government to appropriate money to
cover its obligations.)
Thus final Section of the paper first will examine
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the two forms of backdoor subsidy that are left out by tax
expenditure analysis. Section III.A discusses the need for
an accounting of costs associated with the credit activity
of the federal government. The 1981 Budget2 19 for the first
time implements the recommendation of the 1967 Commission on
Budget Concepts that the Budget should reflect costs of
credit activity. The recognition that credit activity can
involve major costs is an important insight if the tradi-
tional budget-reform goal of providing "a full accounting"
is to be achieved. It is especially important in accounting
for housing programs to include costs of credit activity
because the major housing programs for the nonpoor220 have
been credit programs, whereas housing programs for the poor
have been dependent upon tax expenditures and direct sub-
sidies. Traditional tax expenditure analysis, therefore,
has tended to focus on providing a full accounting of the
costs of housing programs for the poor, while overlooking
potential costs of housing programs for the nonpoor.
While the credit accounting provided in the 1981
Budget represents an important addition to traditional tax
expenditure analysis, the Budget's treatment of credit has
two important drawbacks. First, because of the exemption
of certain housing programs from the credit control system,
the system is likely to work in the long term to make
housing programs more regressive. Second, the Budget's
accounting of credit outlays has limited usefulness as
the basis for restructuring housing programs because the
-82-
system does not calculate how much subsidy is hidden in
credit programs. Without such calculations, it is impossible
to compare the cost efficiency of credit programs with
programs that use a different funding approach: with tax expendi-
ture or direct-subsidy programs. Section III.A concludes
by discussing the effects on program design of using a
credit approach to housing programs.
Section III then proceeds to discuss the third major
kind of backdoor expenditure. Section III.B contests the
characterization of direct subsidies presented in tax expen-
diture- analysis, which assumes that direct subsidies are
the ideal funding format, in contrast the "invisible and
unaccountable" tax expenditures. Section III.B shows that
the major direct-subsidy programs for housing have involved
"uncontrollable expenditures" structured to disguise the
level and type of the financial commitment that has been
made. Thus the goal of budget reform should not be defined
in terms of translating tax expenditures into direct sub-
sidies. Instead, budget reformers should concentrate on
making all expenditures visible and accountable no matter
what their funding format.
The paper ends with an attempt to gain historical
insight into the question of why backdoor expenditures
have been such a persistent feature of American domestic
policy in general and of housing policy in particular.
Section III.C shows that, since the Civil War, backdoor
expenditures have helped to resolve a basic contradiction
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in American politics, between 1) the desire to effect social
goals through market mechanisms by giving "incentives" to
private actors and 21 the taboo against giving private actors
public funds which they use for private
gain (even in the form of "incentives").
A. The role of credit in housing policy
The amount of money involved in tax expenditures for
housing (other than homeowner deductions) pales beside the
huge amounts of money involved in federal credit assistance
for housing. This section first outlines the three primary
forms of federal credit activity and gives an indication
of the amounts of money involved. It then describes the
failure of budget reformers to institute a system that would
account for and control federal credit expenditures during
the period when tax expenditure analysis was gaining a
political foothold. The discussion then focuses on the
system of accounting for and controlling federal credit
expenditures that was introduced in the 1981 Budget. The
final subsection presents a brief evaluation of the
approach taken in the Budget.
1. Major types of credit programs benefiting housing
There are three basic types of credit programs that
benefit housing. The most straightforward programs entail
direct loans from the government. These are also the
least common: the small VA direct loan program and the
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low-interest loans given under Section 221 are examples.
The second major type of government involvement in
housing credit operates through the secondary mortgage market.
The three secondary mortgage market entities are GNMA, a
government agency that deals primarily in federally subsidized
mortgages; FNMA, an off-budget semiprivate corporation that
deals traditionally in FHA and VA mortgages; and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) ("Freddie Mac"),
founded in 1970 to deal in conventional mortgages. All buy
and sell permanent mortgage loans. This activity can
increase or decrease the overall flow of funds to mortgages. 22
1
It can also channel interest subsidies to certain types of
loans.
Loan guarantees are the final kind of federal govern-
ment involvement with credit for the housing market.222 FHA
mortgage insurance, begun in 1934, pledges the government
to pay the lender if a borrower defaults. The VA mortgage
guarantees program operates similarly. 223 The third
major kind of loan guarantee program entails GNMA guarantees
for mortgage-backed securities. 224 These guarantees pledge
GNMA to take the loss if the mortgages "backing" the security
should default.
The amounts of money involved in credit assistance for
housing are huge. The government's contingent liability
from the two major FHA programs alone has been estimated
at over $75 billion.225 The total contingent liability
outstanding for FHA insurance has been estimated at about
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$106 billion; for VA guarantees the estimatewas about
$88 billion; for GNMA guarantees about $65 billion.22 6
FNMA and FHLMC grew from $40 billion in 1973 to $58 billion
seven years later, an increase of 45%, due primarily to a
steep increase in the activity of FHLMC (which represented
7% of all credit assistance for housing in 1973; 27% in
1977) 227
Traditionally, credit programs have generally been
thought of as "support" programs, costing little or nothing
in the long run. The FHA insurance program, one "support"
program, is designed so that the income received from fees
and premiums normally covers program costs. FNMA and FHLMC
also are designed to be self-supporting, although both
receive substantial tax preferences. The VA mortgage
guarantee program and GNMA both are not designed to be
self-supporting, i.e. the income they receive does not cover
program costs.
2. Failure of budget reformers to control and account
for federal credit activity
The recommendations of the Report of the Commission
on Budget Concepts regarding what the tax expenditures
should be included in the Budget were implemented in 1968228
and were incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act
in 1974. The Commission's recommendations regarding credit,
however, did not fare so well. Although its recommendation
that direct loans should be counted as expenditures was
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adopted, its recommendation that the subsidy elements should be
calculated for all credit programs has been implemented only
in a very few instances.229 In addition, the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 did not provide for a separate accounting
of credit activity, and exempted credit (other than direct-
loan programs) from the budget process.230 In the 1970s,
a chapter discussing loan guarantees was introduced into the
Special Analysis document that accompanies the budget, but
accounting for credit disbursements before the 1981 Budget
was in a very rudimentary state. The Comptroller General
testified at one of two sets of the hearings held in 1976
and 1977:231
It is significant that almost no information
is available regarding [the relationship between
direct subsidies and credit policies.... It] has
not adequately been dealt with... either publicly
or by the Congress. [The attention given to
credit policies] is all out of proportion... in
relation to [that given to]...appropriatedfunds
in the budget... .We believe that there should
be full disclosure of the budget impact of
existing and proposed Federal credit and credit
support programs. Only if there is full disclosure
through the budget process can the full impact of
such programs and the tradeoff with other federal
programs be evaluated. 232
The Comptroller General might have added that tax expendi-
tures also now receive far more public attention than do
most credit policies. He did note that "almost no informa-
tion is available" about the relationship among loan guaran-
tees, direct loans and direct subsidies. 2 33
The hearings documented the recent extremely rapid
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growth of federal credit disbursements, which grew 162%
in the decade from 1970-1980.234 The hearings presumably
were part of the momentum that led to President Carter's
promise in the 1980 Budget to introduce credit controls
as soon as possible. 2 3 5
3. The accounting of credit programs and the system for
control of credit expenditures in the 1981 Budget
The 1981 Budget introduces the first comprehensive
accounting for credit activity. Since prior documentation
of credit programs was ad hoc and incomplete,236 the fact
that an accounting is being provided for credit programs
at all is a step forward. Just as the formal accounting of
tax expenditures was the first step in the process of calling
attention to the costs of tax expenditures, the accounting
presented in the Budget is a first step in calling attention
to the costs of credit programs.
The approach taken in the Budget is to record the
net funds advanced in a given year, i.e. the difference
between the amount of loans outstanding at the beginning and
at the end of the year. The only form of credit subsidy
calculated is interest subsidy that arises when the federal
government gives credit directly at a lower interest rate than
would be charged by private lenders. 237
This method of accounting serves as the data base
for the system of controls over credit activity instituted
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in the 1981 Budget.238 The system is aimed at controlling
aggregate amounts of lending for both direct loan and loan
guarantee programs by setting annual limitations on gross
liability, in the form of binding limitations on individual
programs proposed for inclusion in annual appropriations
acts. 2 39
The control system implemented in the Budget is con-
ceded to be a limited one.240 At present, all housing credit
programs are exempted. At one point the reason given is
the "current uncertainty in the housing market. "2 41 That is,
the housing industry is excluded from credit limitations
temporarily because it already is plagued by scarce and ex-
pensive credit. But a closer reading of the Budget reveals
that some important housing programs are intended permanently
to be exempted from the controls. Exemption for FHA loan
guarantees and GNMA guarantees of mortgage-backed securities
are intended to be temporary and will be re-evaluated in
1982.242 However, the exemption of FNMA and FHLMC is perma--
nent (at least in this "initial phase") because both are
off-budget agencies and all off-budget agencies are excluded
from the controls. The exemption of VA mortgage guarantees
also is permanent, because a ceiling allegedly would be
illegal since the VA gives a "clear and unqualified entitlement
to the qualified applicant." 243
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4. Evaluation of the 1981 Budget's treatment of credit
programs
The decision to provide a formalaccounting of credit
activity and to control credit outlays will help to remedy
the tendency of tax- and budget-reformers to focus exclusively
on tax expenditures and direct subsidies to the exclusion
of credit programs. The proposed system is by no means
perfect, however. Two criticisms are presented below.
Exemptions from credit controls. The programs exempted from
the credit control system are exempted either directly or
indirectly as a result of their political power. A recent
article in the New York Times linked the fact that a bill
for a stronger credit control system introduced by Represen-
tative Norman Mineta had little chance of passage with the
fact that the Administration this year explicitly exempted
from its proposed credit controls the bulk of Government
credits including "the politically powerful mortgage
guarantees issued by the Federal Housing Administration
and the Veterans' Administration, and the Government National
Mortgage Association guarantees of mortgage-backed securities."
The FHA and VA programs benefit, and therefore presumably
gain political support from, the banking community and the
guarantees
middle class; GNMA mortgage go predominantly for lower-income
housing, but also have powerful political allies in the
banking community.
A number of reasons are given in the Budget for exempting
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the various housing programs, but if these are examined closely
it becomes apparent that they all tie back to the programs'
political power. The VA is exempted because it had the poli-
tical clout to obtain a clear and unambiguous entitlement24 5
-- the kind of entitlement that has never been obtained in
any housing program for the poor.246 The Budget cites as the
reason why FNMA and FHLMC are exempted the fact that both
organizations are off-budget. But don't the programs succeed
in staying off-budget largely because they have the political
power to do so?247
The proposed system of credit controls is informed by
political reality just as was the strategy of tax reformers.
In each case, political considerations have yielded the same
results: budget reform efforts are concentrated on purifying
the programs for the poor, while challenges to the politically
more powerful programs for the nonpoor are deferred indefi-
nitely. We have seen this strategy at work in the tax expen-
diture context, as tax expenditure analysts ignore homeowner
deductions to focus on purifying the shelters for low-income
housing. It seems that credit control advocates are adopting
the political strategy of challenging programs for the poor
but not those for the nonpoor.
The decision to exempt all major housing programs for
credit controls is an example of this political strategy.24 8
The credit programs exempted are programs that traditionally
have been the primary (non-tax) housing programs for the
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nonpoor: the FHA and VA loan guarantee programs and FNMA
and FHLMA secondary mortage market operations. FHA
traditionally has benefited the lower-middle class,249 while
VA has given its largest benefits to the middle class. 2 50
FNMA's activities, because it deals primarily in FHA and VA
mortgages, also has given benefits primarily to the nonpoor.
FHLMC, which handles only conventional house loans, pre-
sumably has benefited primarily the middle and upper-middle
income people who have been able to afford the high prices
of conventionally financed single-family houses during the
period since FHLMC was founded in 1970.251
Even GNMA, in theory used to provide subsidies primarily
to government subsidized housing, in fact channels a substan-
tial proportion of its benefits to the nonpoor. HUD's 1977
accounting for special assitance functions shows that only
56% of GNMA's commitments since its founding in 1968 have gone
to buy mortgages of low-income housing. (This proportion had
been raised to 70% for 1977 expenditures considered alone.) 252
Since housing credit programs benefit primarily the
nonpoor, a strategy of budget analysis that keeps sharp con-
trols on direct subsidies and tax expenditures -- the two
funding formats used predominantly in programs for the poor 2 53
-- while not challenging credit programs or those tax expendi-
tures that benefit the nonpoor, ultimately will help skew the
distribution of housing benefits more and more towards the
nonpoor. This basic conclusion will hold even if FHA and
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GNMA guarantees are included in the credit control system
by the early 1980s. For the FHA and GNMA guarantees are
the least regressive of the major credit programs. Controls
over FHA mortgage insurance will affect, in addition to the
bulk of lower-middle class FHA beneficiaries, the programs
which ensure the mortgages of Section 8 projects for lower-
income people.
Meanwhile, no controls are planned for FNMA or FHLMC.
Yet it is these secondary mortgage market programs that are
growing. The heyday of FHA and VA, when 30% to 50% of the
housing starts each year were built under the two programs,254
is past. Recently the proportion of FHA and VA loans has
fallen to about 6% of all housing loans.255 By contrast,
credit activity of FNMA and FHLMC has boomed. This is par-
ticularly true of FHLMC, which deals only with conventionally
financed (i.e. fairly expensive) homes. FHLMC's expenditures
grew in the four years from 1973 and 1977 from 7% to 27% of
total government credit assistance for housing.256 Moreover,
its portfolio grows at a rate of about 30%/year, whereas
FNMA's portfolio, composed largely of lower-priced FHA and
VA mortgages, is growing at roughly 5%/year. 25 7
In conclusion, an analysis of the credit control system
proposed in the 1981 Budget suggests that budget reformers
(like tax reformers before them) propose to focus their efforts
on purifying politically more vulnerable programs that happen
to benefit the poor, while ignoring programs that are less
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vulnerable politically because they benefit primarily the
nonpoor. The regressive implications of this choice should
not be overlooked.
Failure to calculate subsidies implicit in credit activity.
The accounting system introduced in the 1981 Budget calculates
the net amounts of credit given annually. It does not, except
in a small minority of cases, provide any calculations of the
amounts of subsidy implicit in credit programs. Yet such
figures are vital if credit programs are to be compared with
tax expenditure and direct subsidy approaches, for without
calculations of the subsidy element of credit activities, it
is impossible to evaluate the cost efficiency of credit programs.
Calculations of the net amounts of credit given annually
are useful in determining the effects of federal credit programs
on the economy as a whole. These macroeconomic impacts can
be important considerations in the design and evaluation of
credit programs. In 1968, for example, there was virtually full
employment as well as substantial inflation. The Office of
Management and Budget decided that, under these conditions,
FNMA by buying up mortgages was in effect increasing government
expenditures just as if the federal government had issued new
dollar bills and spent them as direct subsidies. 2 5 8 Although
this is now considered to have been an overreaction, the
secondary mortage does under certain economic conditions
impact the economy with substantial costs.
More recently it has been suggested that federal credit
activity has contributed to declines in economic growth and
to inflation. Economists have argued that loan guarantees tend
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to allocate resources to politically influential borrowers
rather than to investments that might be more productive eco-
nomically. Representative Norman Minetta noted the relation-
ship between loan guarantee programs and inflation:
We have credit programs offering loans at 7,
6 and 2 percent,....On the one hand we're trying
to slow money growth to stop inflation while on
the other hand we're handing out Federal loans
at interest rates below what it costs the
Treasury to borrow the money from the public.259
The proposed credit accounting system based on net annual
credit activity is useful in determing the macroeconomic
impacts of credit programs. However, an important drawback is
its failure to disclose the amounts of subsidy hidden in the
various credit programs.260 Calculations of subsidy are vital,
1) if credit programs are to be compared with alternative
direct subsidy and tax expenditure approaches, 2) if the cost
efficiency of credit programs is to be evaluated, and 3) if
a full accounting is to be provided that affords a way of
measuring annual expenditures. The President's Commission
on Budget Concepts recommended that subsidies associated with
credit programs is calculated in the Budget, but the recom-
mendation was not carried out.261 The only calculations I
could find of subsidies entailed in housing credit programs
are those in Henry Aaron's Shelter and Subsidies published in
1972. 262
Considerable attention has been focused recently on
how to calculate the amounts of subsidy involved in loan
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guarantee programs. An official from the General Accounting
Office explained the general principle in the recent hearings:
The degree of subsidy and the cost to the
Government in a loan guarantee program both
depend on the underlying risks and upon such
features of the guarantee as the fee to be
charged, the fraction of the loan to be
guaranteed, the extent of recourse to assets
of the borrowers, and other features of the
agreement.
These features can be set to achieve almost
any desired degree of subsidy, which at
the same time will determine the cost to
the Government.2 63
In other words, the level of subsidy involved in a loan
guarantee program depends on the risks involved and on the
degree to which recipients pay to help cover those costs.
Even when a loan guarantee (such as the FHA mortgage
insurance program) is designed so that income is supposed
to cover costs, its long-term financial self-sufficiency
depends upon the rate of defaults, which in turn depends upon
market and economic conditions. If conditions differ sub-
stantially from those predicted, therefore, the FHA could
entail substantial subsidies. 2 6 4
Programs not designed to be self-sufficient can entail
very substantial subsidies. Again, the amount of subsidy is
determined by the extent to which income from fees and
premiums covers expected outlays. VA mortgage guarantees
have been subsidized throughout their existence. 2 65 The
amount of risk entailed is what ultimately determines the
price of a loan guarantee program. At one extreme, the
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standard FHA mortgage insurance program involves relatively
small risks (and, therefore, minimal outlays) under normal
economic conditions. At the other extreme, public housing
involves very high risks, and, therefore, very high potential
costs. In the recent hearings the GAO testified that it
is unlikely that public housing projects will general suffi-
cient revenues to service any of their bond debt. Under
these high-risk circumstances, the cost of loan guarantees
can equal or exceed the cost of an equivalent direct subsidy,
since government probably will have to pay off all interest
and principle on the $14 billion of public housing bond
guarantees. 266
Mortgage insurance for other low-income housing programs
also can be expected to entail high costs. Since fully one-
fourth26 7 of Section 236 projects have defaulted, the spectre
exists that Section 236 -- and, presumbly, Section 8 projects
as well -- may involve huge hidden costs. This prospect
becomes more likely when one projects the cash flow of a
typical Section 8 project in 10 - 20 years. By that time,
the tax shelter will have been used up. Since cash flow
from many if not most Section 8 projects will not be large,
investors will simply be waiting to sell off at a time that
minimizes recapture. Once the minimum number of months
required to avoid recapture has passed, holding onto the
project will only decrease the rate of return.268 One of
several scenarios is possible. If a healthy market for
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for apartments exists, the project owners could sell to
someone who wanted to put the building on the market at
market rents. This is commonly thought to be what will happen
to many if not most Section 8 elderly projects. Alternatively,
the new owner could keep the Section 8 subsidy arrangement
(along with Section 8 tenants) -- this would offer greater
cash-flow security, especially if the building was in a
neighborhood that precluded market-rate rents. Finally --
and this would be an attractive alternative to owners of a
project for which no buyers could be found -- the owner
could default. This would trigger recapture just as would
a sale,269 so that the owners could get out of the project
on schedule and preserve their rate of return. It would
also mean that the costs of the FHA loan guarantees on Section
8 projects would turn out to be much longer than originally
anticipated.
In conclusion, a system of credit accounting that docu-
ments only net amounts of credit is useful for measuring the
macroeconomic impacts of credit programs. In order to compare
the costs of credit programs with those of tax-expenditure
and direct-subsidy alternatives, however, the amount of
subsidy hidden in credit programs also must be calculated.
5. Credit programs, tax expenditure analysis and housing
policy reform
The 1981 Budget has made an important first step in
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focusing attention on credit programs. No full accounting
of federal housing expenditures can ignore the costs
associated with credit programs; tax expenditure analysis
does so by focusing on direct subsidies and tax expenditures
exclusively. Credit policies should not be overlooked for
three reasons. First, once the costs of credit programs
(particularly loan guarantee programs) are added into the
other costs of the present pattern of low-income housing
expenditures, it might well become clear that a production
subsidy approach to low-income housing involves impossibly
high costs /unit. Second, once the costs of credit programs
are added to the costs of direct-subsidy and tax-expenditure
programs, the striking regressivity of housing programs may
well become even more pronounced, since credit programs (now
counted as free) benefit predimonantly the nonpoor.
Finally, analysis of credit programs should be inte-
grated with analyais of tax-expenditure and direct-subsidy
programs because credit programs have peculiar characteris-
tics with important program design implications that should
be considered in a comprehensive restructuring of housing
programs.
At the recent hearings, a Treasury Departmen official
noted three disadvantages of loan guarantees relative to
270
other forms of federal assistance. In addition to being
a "shotgun approach to risk" -- i.e. like tax expenditures,
difficult to target on a precisely defined group -- the
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official noted that loan guarantees can entail potential
losses greater than either direct capital grants or tax
expenditures. The potential loss from loan guarantees
includes not only the principal amount but also the interest
owed on the loan. Moreover, the bureaucratic and political
embarassment that results from defaults means that wasted
support may often be funneled into hopeless projects to avoid
default at any cost. Finally, particularly when loan guaran-
tees are linked with tax incentives, they may encourage
private developers to undertake uneconomic projects for
tax reasons, and then default. Any attempt to restructure
housing programs that concentrateson tax expenditures and
direct subsidies exclusively (as does tax expenditure analysis)
would fail to consider any of these three factors in its
proposed restructuring of housing programs.
B. Direct subsidies as backdoor expenditures
Tax expenditure analysis'assumption that all direct
subsidies are visible, accountable and controllable is
incorrect. In fact, direct expenditures for housing have
normally been structured to hide the type and level of
financial commitment being made. This pattern began with
public housing, a program usually thought of as the epitome
of a direct, front-door approach to governmental provision
of housing.
The public housing program, when it was introduced
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in 1937, offered two alternative ways for localities to cover
debt service on the project mortgage.271 The first was a
straightforward system of capital grants made by the federal
government to the local housing authority (LHA). This
system, however, was a dead letter. All projects used the
alternative method offered, whereby the federal government
and the LHA agreed on a "contract" that committed the federal
government to make uniform yearly payments to the LHA for
a term of up to 60 years. Since the "annual contribution"
was set at an amount covering debt service, the methods were
the same from the viewpoint of the LHA. But from the federal
government's point of view, the methods differed in one very
important respect. To the extent that capital grants were
given, the entire cost of the housing project would count
as a current federal expenditure in the year of construction.
For this reason the capital grants were not popular with
federal officials, who preferred to have only the (much
smaller) annual debt service reflected in the annual budget.
The system of annual contributions was somewhat
extraordinary in that it assumed to bind the
federal government to a series of long-term con-
tracts. Politically, it was a useful way of
organizing a housing program. It called for
pelatively small annual appropriations; this
made the passage of the (public housing) bill
more palatable to fiscal conservatives. Had
outright capital grants been made, huge sums of
money would have been necessary at the outset.
As it was, the gofernment bought public housing
on the installment plan. 272
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If the method chosen to finance public housing was
"backdoor," at least the amounts needed each year during the
repayment term were set from the start. Such was not the
case when the basic approach developed in the public housing
context was adapted first for the Great Society programs
(Sections 235 and 236) and then for Section 8.
The Great Society programs committed the government
to pay the difference between the amounts paid by program
beneficiaries273 and the amount needed to cover the actual
debt service at market rates charged by the bank. Of course,
the amount of the subsidy/unit grew as interest rates rose.
When the programs were enacted in 1968, with interest rates
about 6.5%, the maximum subsidy for Section 235 and Section
236 were 50% and 35% of mortgage payments respectively. By
1970, with intrest rates on FHA mortgages at 8.5%, maximum
subsidy level had risen to 60% for Section 235 and 44% for
Section 236.274
In Section 8 the level of subsidy needed per unit was
tied to a factor even more volatile than interest rates:
rents. A Section 8 commitment is a promise to pay a developer
the difference between that amount of the rent roll paid by
el gible low-income tenants (equal to about 25% of their
incomes) and the market rental of the projects.275 Thus the
amount of subsidy required per unit rises automatically if
the rate of growth in the incomes of low-income people does
not match the rate of growth of market rents. This, of course,
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is what has happened. As a result, if rents and incomes
increase in the future at the same rates as in the past,
Section 8 subsidy commitments "will turn out to be seriously
underfunded," according to an 1978 CBO study.276 This is
so because budget authority for Section 8 is based on the
maximum allowable rent for the first year times the term
of the commitment. If rents rise faster than do tenant
incomes, therefore, the amount of subsidy required per unit
rises automatically.2 77
The 1981 Budget acknowledges the impact of structuring
direct subsidies as were the subsidies to public housing,
Section 236 and Section 8. The Budget calls such outlays
"uncontrollable," 278 and notes that fixed costs and open-
ended programs (of which housing assistance programs are an
example)279 have been growing at such a rapid rate that the
proportion of government expenditures rated as uncontrollable
has been rising very rapidly:
As recently as 1967, open-ended programs and
fixed costs accounted for only 36% of total
outlays. By 1973 they were more than 50% of
the budget and in 1981 the are estimated to
be 59%. 80
Once these costs are added to costs uncontrollabe because
they represent prior-year contracts, about three-fourths
281
of all outlays in the 1981 Budget are uncontrollable.
In summary, the tax reformers' view that direct sub-
sidies are per se desirable must be reconsidered once the
primary concern has shifted from tax to budget reform.
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Many direct subsidies do not meet budget reform goals
because 1) they are not readily visible and therefore are
not accountable expenditures, and 2) even to the extent that
they are accountable, they are impossible to control (at
least in the short term ). Budget reformers must therefore
stop equating the issue of funding format with budgetary
goals. Budgetary reformers' goal should be to structure
expenditures to maximize visibility, accountability, and
controllability of expenditures regardless of whether the
funding format chosen involves direct subsidies, tax expendi-
tures, or credit activity.
C. Backdoor financing as a by-product of the passive
intervention strategy
Once tax expenditure analysis is assimilated into the
broader perspective of "backdoor financing," a striking ten-
dency becomes apparent for all housing programs (for the
nonpoor as well as the poor) to be financed circuitously. To
be sure, distinctions must be drawn between programs such as
VA mortgage guarantees or public housing and the heights of
Byzantine complexity achieved in the contemporary Section 8
projects. Yet before an attempt is made to change the back-
door financing piece by piece, it is worthwhile stopping to
analyze the forces that have driven American housing programs
so consistently to "backdoor" approachs, in contrast (for
example) to the straightforward approach implemented in the
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national highway program.282
1. Backdoor financing as an American way of life
Contrary to reputation, the United States government in
the early 19th century was very much involved in economic
development.
[It] was a period of promotion of enterprise,
of the release of creative energy: government,
reflecting its powerful constituencies, wanted
business and the economy to grow....There was
a public right -- a public duty -- to lend a
hand to productivity. This meant that govern-
ment must provide public goods, especially
transportation.283
Grants to private actors for the construction of turnpikes
and canals were common.
Much of the work of the legislatures, in the
first half of the 19th century, consisted of
chartering transport companies, and amending
their charters....Chartering, however, was
only a small aspect of government participa-
tion. The states and cities played a more
critical role: they supported, by money and
credit, internal improvements; and some they
constructed themselves.284
New York State built the Erie Canal, at a cost of over $7
million.285 Ohio, in 1837, passed a law promising matching
funds for any internal improvement company (railroad, turn-
pike or canal) that met certain standards. 2 86 No self-
consciousness existed about giving direct grants to private
actors (or about government itself replacing private actors
altogether), since in pre-Civil War American the firm distinc-
tion between public and private that came to dominate
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political thought by the late 19th century was still unim-
portant.287 If most of the governmental aid was not in the
form of direct grants288 this was because the government
simply did not have that much cash to spend. A huge
Revolutionary War debt combined with an embryonic tax
structure to limit direct forms of governmental generosity
and enterprise. Consequently, much governmental aid289 was
in the form of land grants, monoplies ("charters"), or
property tax forgiveness.
After the Civil War, when attention turned from turnpikes
and canals to railroads, the government continued to encourage
economic growth. Increasingly, however, a complication entered
in. The meteoric rise of the distinction between public and
private,290 along with the concomitant conviction that govern-
mental intervention in the economic sphere would produce
disastrous results,291 made it ideologically awkward for the
government to be involved directly in economic development.
In addition to potential ideological objections, the tax
structure still raised relatively small amounts of money.
For this combination of idological and practical reasons,
governmental programs after the Civil War switched from
"active" to "passive intervention." Rather than building the
desired railroads itself, the government merely gave subsidies
to the private sector to enable private actors to build.
Backdoor subsidies avoided the awkward mixing of public and
private actors to build a transportation network privately
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owned and operated for profit. Entrepreneurs were not so
ideological as to reject economic benefits, but governmental
participation was designed clearly to signal that the govern-
ment was not buying a participant's (or an owner's) right
to take part in the control of the enterprise.292 Forms of
backdoor financing included extensive land grants given to
railroads by the federal government; local government forgave
property taxes and allowed promoters to finance their schemes
with local bond issues. 2 93
2. Backdoor financing in housing policy
The same combination of ideological and practical advan-
tages has made backdoor financing a frequent approach through-
out the history of Americanhousing policy, because the building
of housing involves some of the same ideological and practical
problems involved in building the transportation infrastructure
in the 19th century.
The first practical consideration was that housing, like
the canals and railroads of an earlier era, is a capital good.
Since capital goods are very expensive, a very large (and
therefore potentially very visible) outlay was required. This
situation has not always led to the use backdoor financing in
American domestic policy: the interstate freeway system and
the space program both involved huge outlays for capital goods
in the form of direct subsidies "up-front." But there is a
crucial difference between these programs and the building of
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housing, turnpikes, canals or railroads. The freeway system
and the space program involve "public goods," in the eco-
nomist's sense of the term.294 Housing -- even public hous-
ing -- clearly is the opposite of a public good: it is
quintessentially private. The canals, turnpikes and railroads
of the 19th century seem at first to be public goods, since
a publicly owned transportation system (such as freeways) is
a public good. But in important ways these earlier transpor-
tation systems were not public. They were private businesses
operated for profit, and hence were no more public than a
supermarket.
Backdoor financing has obvious advantages when govern-
ment funds are used to support construction of a nonpublic
capital good, because this situation involves a violation of
the ideological distinction between public and private and,
since large amounts of money are involved, the violation is
hard to overlook. Backdoor financing eases this dilemma by
disguising the nature and the value of the governmental aid.
Moreover, since capital goods are involved, the use of back-
door methods can be justified on other than purely political
grounds. For even in the private sector (which in the U.S.
is the norm), construction of capital goods often involves
complex financial structures in which funds are difficult to
trace. Backdoor financing can be defended on the ground
that it simply emulates the private sector by creating finan-
cial structures of similar complexity. (The rationale behind
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the complex financial arrangements, of course, is that since
a capital good lasts a long time, it should be paid for over
a long period, rather than incurring the entire cost "up-
front.")
The ideological distinction between public and private
makes a passive intervention strategy supported by backdoor
financing attractive for another reason. One of the central
tenets of the ideology of public and private is that "the
market" can achieve a given production goal with optimal
efficiency. In recent times this traditional economic argu-
ment has merged with the "interest group" analysis of American
politics to produce a new version of the traditional rationale
for a passive intervention strategy. Not only is "working
through the market" inherently more efficient than is direct
governmental intervention (the argument goes); it also
offers political advantages, since accommodation of private
interest groups means that one gains their political support.
In either version of the argument, the fact that "incentives"
give the government little control over the ultimate product
is considered desirable because the "discipline" of the
market system is thereby left as nearly intact as possible.
This second argument about the economic and political
advantages of a passive intervention strategy has been par-
ticularly important since 1968, when housing policy analysts
reached the conclusion that public housing was "such a
failure" whereas the FHA and VA programs were "such a success"
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because the latter worked through the market, preserving private
incentives, whereas the former did not, depending instead on
direct governmental intervention. The desire to garner poli-
tical support for low-income housing from the private actors
who would receive the incentives lurked not far behind the
economic argument that the private market would be more
efficient in producing low-income housing than would the
government. 295
Once the focus is shifted from tax expenditures onto all
forms of backdoor spending, the limitations of tax expenditure
analysis become obvious. If tax expenditures are viewed as
only one form of backdoor spending,296 it is clear that
analysis of tax expenditures must be augmented with analysis
of other funding formats--of credit activities and "uncon-
trollable" direct subsidies. From this new perspe-ctive,
backdoor spending can be placed in historical perspective,
and the reasons for its persistance in American history can
be analyzed.
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Conclusion
There are two major points.
The first involves a critique of tax expenditure
analysis' traditional focus on translating tax expenditures
into direct subsidies.297 Figure 6 shows that existing
housing programs both for the poor and the nonpoor utilize not
only tax expenditures and direct subsidies, but also credit
policies. As we have seen, all three types of funding formats
can be cost-inefficient and can lack visibility and control-
lability. Therefore, once the narrow focus on tax reform is
replaced by a more ambitious attempt to restructure housing
programs to achieve housing-policy goals, tax-reform goals,
and the budgetary goals of cost-efficiency , visibility
and controllability of expenditures, traditional tax expendi-
ture analysis must be replaced with a broader analysis of the
interaction between funding format and those housing, tax and
budgetary goals. 298
The second major point concerns the political strategy
used by tax-expenditure analysts, first in the tax- and
now in the budget-reform context. Tax- and budget-reformers
naturally have chosen to focus their attacks on programs they
thought they could change. Unfortunately, since housing
programs that benefit the poor have far less solid political
support than do housing programs that benefit the middle
class and the rich, first the tax- and then the budget-reformers
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Figure 6: Funding format of housing expenditures
Housing expenditures for the nonpoor
Tax expenditures:
Credit:
Direct subsidies:
homeowner deductions
capital gains deferral on sale of
principal residence
bad debt reserve
tax shelters (for luxury apartments
and nonresidential)
FNMA & FHLMC tax preferences
FHA mortgage insurance
VA mortgage guarantees
VA low-interest loans
GNMA credit activity (tandem plan)
FNMA credit activity
FHLMC credit activity
CDBG rehabilitation funds
Section 312 rehabilitation funds
Section 236
Section 235 (revised)
Section 202 housing for the elderly
and handicapped
Housing expenditures for the poor
Tax expenditures:
Credit:
Direct subsidies:
local housing authority bonds
state housing finance agency bonds
tax shelters (includes Sect. 167(k))
FHA loans and guarantees
Rural Housing Insurance Fund
GNMA subsidies
GNMA credit activity
public housing (annual contributions
and operating subsidies)
Section 8 rent supplements
Section 235 (original)
Section 202 housing for the elderly
and handicapped
Section 312 rehabilitation
CDBG rehabilitation funds
Sources: CBO, Real Estate Tax Shelter Subsidies and Direct
Subsidy Alternatives, pp. 40-4; Senate Budget Comm.,
Tax Expenditures (Comm. Print. Sept. 1978).
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have focused attacks on programs benefiting the poor (e.g.
low-income housing tax shelters) while leaving alone those
programs that predominantly benefit the nonpoor (e.g. home-
owner deductions and housing credit programs).
The focus of tax- and budget-reformers on programs for
the poor is intended to be temporary.299 Yet, the fact that
backdoor expenditures have been so persistant throughout
American history raises questions about whether backdoor
spending ever can be eliminated entirely, since backdoor
spending plays a useful role by blunting the contradiction
between the fact that Americans want to utilize passive
intervention programs despite the taboo against mixing public
and private by giving public money ("incentives") to private
actors. If backdoor spending never will be eliminated
entirely, any success of tax- and budget-reformers in trans-
lating housing programs for the poor into subsidies that are
visible and accountable may well have serious regressive
effects if housing subsidies for the nonpoor continue
involve backdoor funding. For then, housing expenditures
for the poor will be very visible to voters, whereas housing
expenditures for the nonpoor will be largely unrecognized.
This is the situation that existed during the 30 years of
public housing,300 and the result, presumably, would be
similar: increased political vulnerability of housing
programs for the poor linked with relative political
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invulnerability of housing programs for the nonpoor. The
regressive implications of the political strategy of
tax- and budget-reformers should be recognized.
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PATHWAYS, supra note 22, at 234.
67. SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 70.
Surrey himself opposed the homeowner deductions in
PATHWAYS, while noting that "Congressional attitudes
towards home ownership (made) it unlikely the provisions
would be abolished in the absence of a substitute program."
PATHWAYS, supra note 9, at 236. See text at notes 182-
216 below for an evaluation of homeowner deductions today.
68. In contrast to another counterattack on Surrey's theory
by Boris Bittker, who attacked Surrey's premise that
"loopholes" entailed expenditures. See e.g., Bittker,
The Tax Expenditure Budget--A Reply to Professors Surrey
& Hellmuth, 22 NATL. TAX J. 538, 542 (1969).
69. Both points were made during hearings in 1967. See
generally, Tax Incentives to Encourage Housing in Urban
Policy Areas: Hearings on S. 2100 Before the Committee
on Finance of the Senate, 90th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess.
(1967) (hereinafter cited as S.2100 Hearings).
70. See text at note 136-167 infra.
71. S.2100 was introduced by Robert Kennedy. See S.2100
Hearings.
72. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT
HOME (1969).
73. Act of July 5, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-375 Sec.l(5); 82
Stat. 284 (1968).
74. Although in theory a developer needed to contribute 10%,
the allowance of "builder's and sponsor's profit"
(BSPRA) brought the effective percentage down to 1%.
See J. KRASNOWIESKI, HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 262
(1969) (hereinafter cited as KRASNOWIESKI).
75. The legal structure involved is a limited partnership,
with the developers as general partners and the "passive
investors" as limited partners.
76. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.167(k). Section 167(k)
actually was proposed by the Treasury--a fact that shows
the ambivalence of the major institutions involved in
the tax expenditure debate PATHWAYS, supra note 9, at
241.
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77. See MCCOY, supra note 22, at 71.
78. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.1250(a) (1)(C) (1969) (amended
1976). The section applied to Section 221(d) (2) and
Section 236 projects. See text at notes 141-148 infra
for description of these programs.
79. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.1039.
80. PATHWAYS, supra note 9, at 266.
81. Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525.
82. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.1250(a) (1).
83. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.189.
84. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.1250(a)(1)(B). The excess
over straight-line will be recaptured if the property
is sold during the first 100 months. Thereafter the
amount of recapture is gradually phased out.
85. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.189(b).
86. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.167(k) (1976).
87. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.167(k) (1).
88. SCHAPIRO, TAX SHELTERS AFTER TAX REFORM 113 (1977).
89. The Treasury in 1977 published proposed regulations that
would have disallowed limited partners from taking as
personal deductions (to "shelter" their personal income)
those business deductions incurred by the partnership.
This would have eliminated the legal basis for the
economic relationship underlying all syndications.
90. The episode is set out in Simon Vetoes New Curbs on Tax
Shelters, Washington Post, January 6, 1977 at 1.
91. The incentives are in INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.191,
which allows for a 5-year write-off of rehabilitation
expenditures and INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.167(o),
which allows for accelerated depreciation of a rehabili-
tated historic property.
92. The disincentives are in INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.
167(n), which disallows other than straightline depre-
ciation if an historic structure is changed other than
via a rehabilitation plan certified by the Department of
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the Interior; and INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec. 280B,
which disallows any depreciation of demolition costs
when a historic structure is demolished.
93. Note that Surrey defines tax expenditure reform to
include budget reform.
94. Fed. Legis. Process, supra note 45, at 26-27.
95. H. Minor, Policy Analysis and the Congress, Chapter 3
(1973) (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis at Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology); B.C.L. REV. 1976, supra note 43,
at 680-682.
96. Pub. L. 93-344 Sections 101(c), 102(a).
97. See text at notes 29-32 infra.
98. CBO Study, supra note 3, at 51.
99. Id.
100. Id., at 55.
101. Id., at 56.
102. The two other criteria utilized in the CBO study are
"incentives for good management and maintenance," and
"ease of administration." See CBO study, supra note 3,
at xiv. These are stray expenditure goals which the
study considers important to consider in restructuring
low-income housing programs. Why these are considered
more important than other expenditure goals, e.g. hori-
zontal equity, consumer sovereignty, location of projects
built, is not discussed by the CBO.
103. See e.g. PATHWAYS, supra note 9, at 33.
104. This contrast is well illustrated by the treatment of
tax shelters in representative sources. In Halfway to
Tax Reform, a 1970 tax reform production, the chapter
on "Windfalls in Real Estate" concentrates solely on
the need to abolish tax shelter "loopholes." See RUSKAY,
supra note 9, at 166-178. Surrey did address the need
to change tax shelters benefiting low-income housing
rather than simply abolishing them, in Pathways to Tax
Reform in 1973. His analysis of the issue, however, was
limited to a few sentences, and his only suggestion was
to transfer the money spent on tax shelters to HUD's
budget to be given out as a direct subsidy. He gave no
details as to how the new program would work. See
PATHWAYS, supra note 9, at 245.
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105. Id., at 31. In grouping Surrey with the tax reformers
during the late 1960's, I do not mean that his approach
is identical to theirs. He at times explicitly distin-
guishes himself from them, see e.g. PATHWAYS, supra note
9, at 236: "Tax reformers have thought only about eli-
minating or cutting back (on homeowner deductions)
without providing a substitute. Given Congressional
attitudes towards homeownership, the latter course does
not seem likely." Moreover, Surrey (in contrast to the
tax reformers) clearly sees the program-design implications
of his tax expenditure analysis. Yet especially during
the late 1960's, he seemed to pay lip service to the
wide implications of tax expenditure analysis while on
most issues adopting a homeowner tax reform outlook.
Examples are given in the text.
106. R. SLITOR, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX IN RELATION TO HOUSING
5 (1968).
107. AARON, supra note 23, at 53-73.
108. NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY REVIEW (NHPR), U.S. DEPT. OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES--
WORKING PAPERS 895-999 (1973) (hereinafter cited as NHPR).
109. See generally, R. Slitor, Rationale of the Present
Benefits for Homeowners, at 42-45, and R. Kuehn, Analysis
of Existing and Proposed Tax Regulations Related to Real
Estate Development in Investment, at 903-904; in NHPR
supra note 108:
There should be no question that our existing tax
regulations related to real estate development
contain certain inequities... However, that said,
it also has to be realized that... real estate
development and housing development in particular
is (sic) not strictly an economic, self-supporting
activity, but depends in part on external forms
of assistance. The Treasury Department's (i.e.
the tax reformers') action to circumscribe effec-
tive tax subsidies for production cannot be uni-
lateral, but must be balanced by compensatory
mechanisms...
at 904.
110. See e.g., Memo from Charles Haar, Professor of Harvard
Law School, to Stuart Eisenstadt, Domestic Policy Advisor
to President Jimmy Carter (April, 1979).
111. See e.g., AARON, supra note 23, at 159-173; conversations
ith~AFthur Solomon, Professor at M.I.T. in Cambridge MA
(Spring term, 1979).
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112. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT--FISCAL YEAR 1981, 193
(1980) (hereinafter cited as BUDGET). This figure
includes all funds spent for excess depreciation for
rental housing, i.e. it includes tax shelter benefits
spent for luxury apartments as well as for lower-income,
government subsidized housing. It therefore overstates
the funds channeled to lower-income housing. It is used
as a very rough approximation of the cost of the tax
shelter for lower-income housing, although of course
the cost of the shelter should be increased by the cost
of tax expenditures for construction period taxes and
interest (and decreased by the amount of depreciation
recaptured).
113. Id., at 192-193.
114. This discussion does not address the CBO study's treat-
ment of tax shelters that benefit non-lower-income rental
housing (i.e. luxury apartments) and commercial buildings.
Tax reformers traditionally have agreed with housing
policy reformers that such tax shelters should simply be
eliminated.
115. CBO study, supra note 3, at xiii.
116. Id., at 107-108.
117. The CBO study does not endorse any alternative explicitly.
I infer its favorable rating of the proposed builders'
credit from the fact that it lists that alternative
first and ranks it most favorably in terms of the cri-
teria established.
118. See CBO study, supra note 3, at 67-72.
119. In an attempt to avoid chaos in the very complex task of
trying to enumerate housing subsidies, I have not dis-
cussed any of the findings made available from the
Farmers' Home Administration or from Community Development
Block Grants; Section 202 I only refer to briefly in the
footnotes.
120. I adopt HUD's term "lower-income," ludicrously vague
though it is, to refer to Section 8, Section 235 and
Section 236 because the programs benefit considerable
numbers of moderate- and middle- as well as low-income
people. See text at notes 176-178 infra.
121. A second direct subsidy, Section 202 (12 U.S.C. Sec.1701[q])
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is available for housing for the elderly and normally
is combined with Section 8 funds. See SENATE BUDGET
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 258-259.
122. 42 U.S.C. Sec.1437(f). Unless otherwise indicated,
references to "Section 8" discuss Section 8 New Construc-
tion/Substantial Rehabilitation, not Section 8 Existing
Housing. For a description of Se tion 8 New Construction/
Substantial Rehabilitation, see SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 24, at 257.
123. 42 U.S.C. Sec.1437(h).
124. In the case of a substantially rehabilitated project,
the physical building is in existence, but its value is
low, so that if it was sold at a foreclosure sale the
proceeds would not cover the loan. It is therefore not
suitable collateral to secure the mortgage.
125. Tax-exempt bonds can attract customers at lower interest
rates than can conventional bonds because the after-tax
yield on a tax-exempt bond is higher than the after-tax
yield on an equivalent taxable bond.
126. This and the other credit programs mentioned here are
more fully discussed in Section III.
127. GNMA and other secondary mortgage market entities (FNMA
and FHLMC) make mortgage money more readily available
in times of shortage by providing lenders assurances
that GNMA will "buy" any loans they originate. Once
GNMA has "bought" the loan, it pays the lender back the
principal amount of the loan--thereby enabling the
lender to originate another loan with the same "money."
(In other words, GNMA speeds up the velocity of mortgage
money, in effect raising supply.) For a clear exposition
of housing financing, see generally R. STARR, HOUSING
AND THE MONEY MARKET (1975) (hereinafter cited as STARR).
128. GNMA then either resells these mortgages at market rate
or keeps them in its portfolio.
129. I am grateful for this example to Elliot Surkin, Esq.,
of Hill & Barlow.
130. The bond proceeds can be used for financing only after
the building is built because it would be impossible--
or at best extremely expensive--to sell unsecured bonds.
131. I am assuming for simplicity that the developer could
borrow the full amount.
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132. Or, in the case of tax shelters, to focus on one set of
taxexpenditures at a time.
133. CBO study, supra note 3, at 41. This figure includes
expenditures for public housing authority bonds ($400
million) and state housing agency bonds ($200 million).
134. Id., at 38.
135. An example of how complex it would be to calculate the
cost per unit under Section 8, see generally J.R. PRESCOTT,
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PUBLIC HOUSING (1974). Prescott does
such calculations for public housing, which has a much
simpler financing structure than does Section 8.
136. The idea of "passive intervention" is introduced in
P. Starr and G. Esping-Anderson, Passive Intervention, 7
WORKING PAPERS 15 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Passive
Intervention).
137. See text at note 11, supra.
138. See e.g., C. Bauer, The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing,
106 ARCHITECTURAL FORUM 140 (1959).
139. See e.g., HAAR, supra note 53, at 56 passim; Passive
Intervention, supra note 136, at 18.
140. The major passive intervention adaptations of public
housing were the turnkey program, in which the local
housing authority (LHA) had a private developer build
buildings which the LHA then managed, and Section 23
Leased Housing, in which the LHA leased privately owned
units for its tenants. Both are described at AARON,
supra note 23, at 118-119.
141. The rent supplement program is codified at 12 U.S.C.
Sec. 1701(s).
142. For a good description of the basics of Sec. 221(d) (3),
see KRASNOWIESKI, supra note 74, at 260-263. It is
codified at 12 U.S.C. Sec.1715(l). See FRIEDMAN,
GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING 91 (1968) (hereinafter cited
as FRIEDMAN) for a description of the early history of
the rent supplement program. The market actually ranged
from 5.76% (for new houses in 1965) to 6.90% (for exist-
ing housing in 1968). 6% is used as an average figure.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 1973
HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 345 (Table 378) (hereinafter
cited as (Year) HUD YEARBOOK).
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143. See e.g., M. Semer, V. Zimmerman, A Foard & J. Frantz,
A Review of Federal Subsidized Housing Programs, in NHPR,
supra note 108, at 121 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Review
of Housing Programs): "...the hubbub which resulted
from the rent supplement proposal can only be described
as astonishing."
144. AARON, supra note 23, at 131.
145. See id., at 136-140, for a general description of Section
235 End Section 236. Section 235 is codified at 12 U.S.C.
1707(z): Section 236 at 12 U.S.C. 1701(z) (1).
146. Id., at 136. The market, 6.5% in 1968, rose to 8.5% by
1970.
147. Section 235 was shut down (and was not re-opened until
it had been substantially reformulated) in 1970 because
of scandals associated with it. See J. PYNOOS, R. SCHAFER
& C. HARTMAN, HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 470 (1973) (hereinafter
cited as PYNOOS).
148. Act of Aug. 1, 1968, Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. Sec.3931 et seq.).
149. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.167(k).
150. Oversight of HUD Programs: Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 91st
Congress, 1st Sess. 259 (1974) (statement of Secty. of
HUD Lynn).
151. See Review of Housing Programs, supra note 143, at 127-
129 passim.
152. Section 8 in theory is a housing allowance. See discus-
sion at notes 169-181 infra.
153. Throughout this discussion, I have lumped new construc-
tion with substantially rehabilitated housing, since the
costs of substantial rehabilitation are close to those
of new building.
154. The fact that Section 8 normally offered more subsidy
per unit than did Section 236 ties back to the fact
that Section 8 is a deeper subsidy, tied to the income
of the tenant rather than to the unit rent (set at debt
service plus operating expenses plus property tax plus
allowable profit). The fact that 1) the gap between
25% of tenant income and the market rent of a Section 8
project has from the beginning of Section 8 been greater
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than 2) the gap between the rent a normal Section 236
tenant could pay and the unit rent (as defined above),
becomes evident in hearings held in Boston in 1977 on
defaults of Section 236 and Section 221(d) (3) projects.
See particularly, Memorandum from Rolf Goetze and Bonnie
Heudorfer to Bob Walsh (Feb. 14, 1977) in Problems with
Multifamily Subsidized Housing in Boston: Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 95th Congress, 1st Sess. (Apr. 18, 1977)
82-88, showing how Section 8 funds were used to fill the
"rent gap" between what tenants could afford to pay
(defined by Section 8 as 20% of their incomes) and the
unit rent (defined above).
155. See e.g., E. Goldston, BURP and Make Money, in PYNOOS,
supra note 147, at 493.
156. See text at notes 120-132 supra.
157. See text at notes 128-130, supra.
158. Review of Housing Programs, supra note 143, at 140.
159. Id., at 140-141.
16.0. See SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24, at
257-258.
161. See 1977 HUD YEARBOOK, supra note 142, at 378 (Table 35).
162. See footnote 166 infra.
163. See text at notes 263-269, infra.
164. See Review of Housing Programs, supra note 143, at 121
(Table 25).
165. This is the estimate of the subsidy per unit used by
Secty. of HUD James Lynn in the hearings defending the
Nixon moratorium on housing programs. Lynn's actual
figure was $2500-3000/unit. See Oversight on Housing
and Urban Development Programs, Part I: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
93rd Congress, 1st Sess. 259 (1973).
166. Distressed HUD Subsidized Multifamily Housing Projects:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 95th Congress, 1st Sess. 1 (Oct. 14
and 17, 1977) (opening statement by Senator Proxmire).
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167. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development--Independent
Agencies Appropriations for 1978: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee of Commerce of the House Appropriations
Committee, 95th Congress, 1st Sess. 37 (1977) (statement
of Grace Milgram). The subsidy calculations presented
are of course only examples of a number of calculations
of the amount of subsidies per unit that have been made
over the years. A comprehensive evaluation of all such
calculations would be a study in itself. In general,
such calculations have been used for two reasons: 1)
to show that a given passive intervention program is
cheaper than public housing, or 2) to show that all new
construction programs are more expensive than programs
that utilize existing housing.
168. Robert Kuttner, who was a member of the staff of the
House Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing at the
time the CBO study was commissioned (by that committee
among others) indicated that it was not the intention
of the Committee to assume the validity of the passive
intervention approach.
169. A third alternative--that of returning to an active inter-
vention production subsidy approach such as public
housing--normally is not taken seriously in housing
policy circles because public housing is considered such
an unpopular program.
170. See text at notes 12-28 supra.
171. See text at notes 37-67 supra.
172. See note 45 supra.
173. If a taxpayer pays no tax, a credit against his tax lia-
bility does not raise his after-tax income (unless the
credit is refundable, which tax credits normally are not).
(See note 174 infra for a definition of a refundable
credit.)
174. See e.g., B.C.L. REV. 1979, supra note 43, at 266-271.
A refundable credit would provide for a direct subsidy
to any taxpayer who does not have enough tax liability
to offset the full amount of a tax credit.
175. See e.g., A. SOLOMON, HOUSING THE URBAN POOR 78-88 (1974).
176. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY:
CURRENT PROGRAMS AND RECURRING ISSUES 28 (1977).
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177. Id. Two production subsidies have served people as poor
as have programs utilizing existing housing: rent
supplements (average income $3,544) and public housing
($3,506). See note 169 and text at notes 140-144 supra.
178. B. FRIEDEN & A.R. WALTER, WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THE
HOUSING ALLOWANCE EXPERIMENT? (Working Paper #62-- Joint
Center for Urban Studies) 14 (1980).
179. See e.g., R. Starr, Which of the Poor Shall Live in
Public Housing? 23 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 116; R. Scobie,
"Problem Families" and Public Housing, 31 THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 126 (1973); R. Starr, A Reply, 31 THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 130 (1973).
180. Submarket analysis was introduced by William Grigsby in
1967. W. GRIGSBY, HOUSING MARKETS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1967).
For a more recent example, see D. BIRCH, AMERICA'S HOUSING
NEEDS 1970-1980 (1973).
181. See C.L. BARNETT, EXPECTED AND ACTUAL EFFECTS OF HOUSING
ALLOWANCES ON HOUSING PRICES (1979).
182. CBO study, supra note 3, at 107.
183. Interview with Stanley Surrey, Professor at the Harvard
Law School (Oct. 22, 1979). See also PATHWAYS, supra
note 9, at 236.
184. See note 6 supra.
185. CBO study, supra note 3, at 39.
186. Id., at 38.
187. See 123 CONG. REC. 511, 40B (daily ed. July 1, 1977)
(statement of Senator Kennedy).
188. See generally B.C.L.R. 1979, supra note 43; P. McDaniel,
Evaluation of Tax Expenditures, 21 TAX NOTES 619 (1979);
P. McDaniel, Institutional Procedures for Congressional
Review of Tax Expenditures, 22 TAX NOTES 659 (1979).
189. A tax credit is less regressive than a deduction because
the credit is not "worth more" the higher the taxpayer's
income. See note 45 supra.
190. In 1977, 77% of Americans with incomes under $5000 were
renters. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE and U.S. DEPT. OF HUD, ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY--
PART A, 10 (1979).
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191. Since 1977, the name of the traditional standard deduc-
tion has been changed to "zero bracket amount." For
clarity I use the old, more familiar terminology.
192. I am referring here to the FHA and VA programs. Tax
benefits were not thought of as housing policies until
the late 1960's. See text at notes 29-32 supra.
193. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 142, at 93-95, and HAAR, supra
at note 53, at 187 passim. Haar views the FHA as a
"taker-of-all-comers"; Friedman shows that most of those
comers have been middle class.
194. V. Bach, Chance to Own 36 (1977) (unpublished thesis at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (hereinafter
Bach).
195. HAAR, supra note 53, at 193.
196. Id., at 34.
197. Id.
198. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 142, at 93-95.
199. Quoted in Bach, supra note 194, at 3.
200. AARON, supra note 23, at 77.
201. For example, in 1978 the maximum FHA mortgage was $60,000.
See SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE REPORT su note 24, at 249.
The average, however, was much lower $34,000 in 1977.
1977 HUD YEARBOOK, supra note 142, at 128.
202. For an explanation of how subsidies can arise even in an
actuarily balanced program such as the FHA, see text at
note 264 infra.
203. See SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 249.
204. An explanation of how very large subsidies were channeled
to veterans through VA loan guarantees appears in HAAR,
supra note 53 at 90-101.
205. The assumption is that virtually all taxpayers who itemize
a) are homeowners, and b) take homeowners' deductions.
The assumption probably is fairly accurate for lower-income
itemizers, since traditionally lower-income taxpayers
choose to itemize in order to take the homeowners' deduc-
tions. The assumption that higher-income taxpayers who
choose to itemize take homeowners' deductions probably
is valid for a different reason: the percentage of home-
ownership traditionally has been very high among high-
income taxpayers.
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206. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. TREASURY, INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX RETURNS 206 (1973).
207. Id., at 74, 85.
208. Tax reformers wanted to encourage people to take the
standard deduction rather than itemizing because they
considered itemized deductions a source of inequity in
the distribution of the tax burden, 1) since deductions
are "worth more" the higher the taxpayer's income, and
2) since most deductions are taken only (or largely) by
higher-income people.
209. I include condominiums in this discussion of single-
family houses. The operative distinction is between
owner-occupied and rental units.
210. Passive Intervention, supra note 136, at 17. But see,
1977 HUD YEARBOOK, supra note 142, at 348, which notes
that 55% of Americans could afford the median-priced new
home in 1970 whereas only 41% could in 1975. Since
housing prices rose very sharply between 1975-1977, it
is possible the two sets of figures do not disagree.
211. See L. GREBLER & F. MITTELBACH, THE INFLATION OF HOUSING
PRICES 5, 95 (1979) (hereinafter cited as GREBLER).
212. Id., at 86.
213. A homebuyer's rate of return is raised because the
stream of tax benefits flowing to him in effect lowers
his after-tax investment in the house.
214. Rounded figures have been chosen for purposes of illus-
tration: the monthly payment figures are not based on
a consistent assumption about interest rates.
215. See 0. OLDMAN & F. SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND
FINANCE, 1979 Supp. 3-79.
216. See New York Times, House Committee Rebuffs Two Reforms
in Carter Tax Bill, Apr. 18, 1978, at 1, col.2.
217. For Mills' first public use of the term "back door
spending," see 113 CONG. REC 36, 405 (1967). In that
speech, Mills uses "back door spending" to refer to tax
credits. I introduce the term "backdoor expenditures"
to refer to credit subsidies and uncontrollable direct
subsidies as well as tax expenditures. See text infra.
218. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON BUDGET CONCEPTS, REPORT
(1967).
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219. See BUDGET, supra note 112, at 17-21; and OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS: BUDGET OF THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT--FY 1981--SPECIAL ANALYSIS E, 141-206
(1980) (hereinafter cited as SPECIAL ANALYSIS).
220. This reference to major housing programs for the nonpoor
excludes homeowner deductions. It refers to the two
major loan guarantee programs (FHA and VA) and the
secondary mortgage market entities (FNMA and FHLMC).
See text at notes 249-251 infra.
221. I am omitting any discussion of Federal Home Loan Bank
Board advances to savings and loan banks.
222. For a good description of the basic workings of the
secondary mortgage market, see STARR, supra note 127, at
167-235.
223. In a default situation where the homeowner has a federal
loan guarantee (FA or VA), 1) the government pays back
the bank that originally gave the loan, 2) in the
meantime, the government forecloses on the house and
tries to resell it. If the house is resold for at least
the amount of the defaulted homeowner's mortgage, then
the government loses no money on the transaction. For
a description of FHA, see AARON, supra note 23, at 77-80;
for a description of VA, see id., at 80.
224. For a description of GNMA mortgage-backed securities,
see M. Semer, J. Zimmerman, A.Foard and J. Frantz,
Evolution of Federal Legislature Policy in Housing:
Housing Credits, in NHPR, supra note 108, at 34 (1973)
(hereinafter cited as Evolution of Housing Credits).
225. Federal Loan Guarantees: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Economic Stabilization of the House Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 95th Congress, 1st
Sess. 158 (Mar. 29, 30, 1977) (hereinafter cited as 1977
Hearings). (The two major FHA programs referred to are
Section 203 and Title I.)
226. Id., at 61. All figures are 1977 estimates of how much
contingent liability would be outstanding in 1979.
227. See 1973 HUD YEARBOOK, supra note 143, at 346; 1977 HUD
YEARBOOK, supra note 143, at 343 (Table 6).
228. Surrey directed the Treasury to draw up the first "tax
expenditure budget" in 1968. See B.C.L. REV. 1976,
supra note 43, at 681.
229. 1977 Hearings, supra note 225, at 112.
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230. Id.
231. Id.; Loan Guarantees and Off-Budget Financing: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
94th Congress, 2nd Sess. (Nov. 10, 1976) (hereinafter
cited as 1976 Hearings).
232. 1977 Hearings, supra note 225, at 4 (statement of Elmer
Staats, Comptroller General of the U.S.). The statement
noted that direct loans as well as appropriated funds
received a high level of scrutiny, because direct loans
(unlike loan guarantees) were included in the budget
prior to 1981.
233. Id., supra note 225, at 112.
234. SPECIAL ANALYSIS, supra note 219, at 145.
235. BUDGET, supra note 112, at 17.
236. See e.g., SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24
at 248, for an example of the prior ad hoc credit
accounting.
237. SPECIAL ANALYSIS, supra note 219, at 194-195.
238. See BUDGET, supra note 112, at Parts 2, 5, and 6 passim;
SPECIAL ANALYSIS, supra note 219, at 141-205; OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES--
APPENDIX 505-510 passim (1980).
239. See SPECIAL ANALYSIS, supra note 219, at 198-201. Credit
is also to be controlled by authorizations.
240. See BUDGET, supra note 112, at 19; SPECIAL ANALYSIS,
supra note 219, at 199-201.
241. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS FOR FY 1981, 51 (1980).
242. See SPECIAL ANALYSIS, supra note 219, at 201.
243. Id., at 200.
244. Crittenden, Government Lending Shows Surge Raising Fears
on Economic Impact, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1980, at 1
(Section A), 15 (Section D) (hereinafter cited as N.Y.
Times).
245. SPECIAL ANALYSIS, supra note 219, at 200. See also
BUDGET, supra note 112, at 82. Presumably the primary
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legal basis of the claim that no limit can be placed on
credit programs that give an entitlement is that denial
of the entitlement to some while giving it to others
would violate the Constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. (There may also be some notion that the
entitlement is a property right, so that a blanket denial
would raise due process questions.) Without further
research, it is not possible to say with certainty how
strong these claims are.
246. It is because the low-income housing programs never have
been entitlements that the problem of horizontal equity
arose and persisted.
247. The decision to take FNMA off the budget (before FHLMC
was founded) originally was due to technical considera-
tions. See STARR, supra note 127, at 193. In recent
years, however, considerable sentiment has built up to
put off-budget agencies back on the budget. See BUDGET,
supra note 112, at 326-329. FNMA and FHLMC evidently
have been able to withstand pressure to be included in
the budget once again.
248. 70% of outstanding loan guarantees are for FHA and VA
housing (1976 figure), 1977 Hearings, supra note 225, at
120. Eliminating those programs from the credit control
system, therefore, means that only about one-third of
total credit transactions are included within the credit
control system. See SPECIAL ANALYSIS, supra note 219,
at 201.
249. See AARON, supra note 23, at 85.
250. Id., at 89.
251. In 1970 the median price of single-family homes was
$23,500 (1970 HUD YEARBOOK, supra note 142, at 312);
in 1976, the median price of single family homes was
$44,200 (1977 HUD YEARBOOK, supra note 142). By the
third quarter of 1979, the median price of a single
family house was $74,500. Median prices of FHA homes
were substantially lower for all three periods. BUREAU
OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CONSTRUCTION REPORTS:
PRICE INDEX OF NEW SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSES SOLD (3rd quarter,
1979) 1.
252. See 1977 HUD YEARBOOK, supra note 142, at 47.
253. Public housing and the public assistance programs (Sect.
236, Sect. 8) both involve direct subsidies as well as
tax expenditures. (In public housing the tax expendi-
tures are for the local housing authority bonds.)
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These programs also involve credit assistance, but the
great bulk of credit assistance has gone to non-poor
beneficiaries through FHA, VA and the secondary mortgage
market entities. Homeowners' deductions, of course, are
the primary tax expenditure for the non-poor.
254. See HAAR, supra note 53, at 33. Only during World War II
did the FHA and VA's proportion of total housing starts
fall below 30% between 1938 and 1958.
255. See GREBLER, supra note 211, at 35 (note 4).
256. See 1973 HUD YEARBOOK, supra note 142, at 346; 1977 HUD
YEARBOOK, supra note 142, at 343 (Table 6).
257. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 225, at 66. Of course,
these percentage figures are influenced by the facts that
a) FNMA's total assets are much larger than are FHLMC's,
and b) that FHLMC is still "gearing up."
258. See, STARR, supra note 127, at 193.
259. See N.Y. Times, supra note 244, at D.15.
260. Only explicit interest rate subsidies are presented.
See BUDGET, supra note 112, at 194.
261. Only in a few instances have credit subsidies been
calculated. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 225, at 112.
262. See AARON, supra note 23, at 98.
263. 1977 Hearings, supra note 225, at 9.
264. See AARON, supra note 23, at 79. For example, the impact
of a severe depression on the government's liability on
FHA mortgages could be acute. During the Depression of
the 30's, over half the mortgages in the country were
foreclosed. Evolution of Housing Credits, supra note
224, at 6.
265. Id., at 80. See also HAAR, supra note 53, at 92 et seq.
266. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 225, at 83. Since the
bonds finance mortgages, these in effect are mortgage
guarantees.
267. See footnote 166 supra.
268. An investor who leaves his money in a housing project
longer than the minimum period required a) to gain all
the tax benefits flowing from the project while b)
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minimizing recapture, reduces his effective rate of
return because his investment will not earn any substan-
tial amount after that period but his money still will
be tied up, whereas he could reinvest that money in
another context (and earn more money) if he sold his
interest in the housing project.
269. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 Sec.1250(c) (10).
270. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 225, at 117 (statement of
David Lilly, member of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve).
271. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 142, at 107.
272. Id., at 108.
273. Tenants in Sect. 235, 236 and 8 projects pay between
one-fourth and one-fifth of their incomes. The programs
pay the difference between the tenants' contributions
and the market rents, but in no event more than the
difference between market rents and what the rent level
would be if the mortgage had a 1% interest rate. See
AARON, supra note 23, at 136.
274. Id., at 137.
275. See CBO study, supra note 3, at 85.
276. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY 62
(1978).
277. Id.
278. See BUDGET, supra note 112, at 42-44, 345-350.
279. See BUDGET, supra note 112, at 346. "Housing assistance
programs" are included in a list of "open-ended programs
and fixed costs." Although the specific programs included
are not mentioned, it would seem from the total expendi-
ture listed ($4.3 billion) that public housing, Section
236 and Section 8 are included, since the total cost for
these 3 programs estimated in the CBO study was $4.0
billion. See CBO study, supra note 3, at 42.
280. See BUDGET, supra note 112, at 43.
281. Id., at 44.
282. The national highway system was, of course, financed by
the Highway Trust Fund; the Trust Fund in turn was
financed by the proceeds of the national gasoline tax.
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283. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 157-158 (1973)
(hereinafter cited as HISTORY OF AM. LAW).
284. Id., at 160.
285. Id.
286. Id. This law was repealed in 1842.
287. See generally, D. Kennedy, History of American Legal
Thought, Chapter I passim (1975) (unpublished manuscript)
(hereinafter cited as Kennedy). Similar ideas are set
out in Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1713-1737 (1975).
288. 0. & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: MASSACHUSETTS 1774-1861,
64-92 (1947). "Torn constantly between the desire to act
and unwillingness to increase expenses, the state occa-
sionally flatly chose between saving and spending. More
often it compromised and sought its ends by indirection"
at 66. The Handlins list many different ways govern-
ment aided economic development "without expenditure of
cash" at 81. "Improvements in communications, roads and
bridges... were favored beneficiaries..." at 73.
289. Of course, at this time, most of the governmental aid
was not from the federal, but from state and local
governments, since the federal government still was
very small and relatively unimportant.
290. See generally, Kennedy, supra note 287, at Chapters II-
IV passim.
291. The most famous expression of this opinion in American
constitutional law, of course, was in LOchner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
292. When government re-entered the sphere of business in
the late 1800's, it took a regulatory strategy--a
much more passive approach than was taken in the pre-
Civil War period. See HISTORY OF AM. LAW, supra note
283, at 385 et seq.
293. For a description on the history of municipal bonds after
the Civil War, see C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. VI, RECONSTRUCTION AND
REUNION 1864-1888, 918-1115 (1971).
294. For a definition of "public goods," see R. HEILBRONER &
L. THUROW, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM 227 (1978).
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295. For an example of this strategy, see FRIEDMAN, supra
note 142, at 14-15 passim.
296. In fact, once tax expenditures are viewed in an histo-
rical context, it becomes clear that tax expenditures
are the variety of "backdoor spending" that predominated
after World War II. Tax expenditures were preceded by
property tax abatements and federal land grants and
followed by credit activity: the predominant variety
of backdoor spending has changed over time, but the
spending's "backdoor" quality has persisted.
297. As noted above, Surrey and McDaniel are still focusing
on translating tax expenditures, and still assume that
direct subsidies are the preferable solution, but they
are concentrating on "second-best" solutions such as
refundable tax credits. See footnote 188 supra.
298. The CBO has made a first tentative attempt to formulate
a comprehensive framework for analysis of housing policy,
but the result is amorphous, in sharp contrast to the
concrete reform approach offered by tax expenditure
analysis. This paper suggests a much more active approach
than that outlined in CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A
BUDGETARY FRAMEWORK FOR FEDERAL HOUSING AND RELATED
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT POLICY (1977).
299. See text at note 80 supra.
300. I do not mean to imply that public housing is no longer
an active program: it is. However, it is no longer the
centerpiece of the low-income housing strategy as it was
for the 30 years from 1937-1967.
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